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Modern Disintegration: A National Study of Racial Disparities in Test Scores and Property 
Values After Desegregation Plans End 
Rayven Plaza 
 
This dissertation is composed of three papers examining the predictors and consequences 
of increasing school segregation following widespread release from court ordered 
desegregation orders. Paper one investigates factors shaping districts’ choices to pursue 
release from desegregation orders. This serves to provide context for papers two and three, 
and to outline whether there are systematic differences between school districts that were 
released from orders and those that were not. Paper two tests whether release from court 
ordered desegregation orders coincided with racially disparate changes in elementary and 
middle school test scores. Paper three presents an analysis of how property taxes – an 
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 In their 2012 paper, Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation 
and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, Sean Reardon and coauthors described 
the current landscape of school desegregation in the United States. They found that the 
federally-imposed school integration mandated by Brown v. Board of Education (1954) had 
become a relic of the past, having been systematically weakened by a series of Supreme 
Court decisions beginning in the 1990s. More than half of the school districts that had once 
been under desegregation orders were released from court oversight and remain 
unsupervised today. Their central finding was this: in the years following release from 
desegregation orders, school districts became increasingly racially segregated.  
 This dissertation is intended as a continuation of the work Reardon and his team 
began. In the following three papers, I investigate what fading desegregation enforcement 
looked like for affected students and their families.  
For both of my outcomes, test scores and property values, I expect that the shape of 
what follows termination from desegregation orders will vary depending on the race of the 
person (or household) experiencing desegregation termination. Reardon and coauthors 
(2012) outline potential impacts of release from desegregation orders on segregation and 
enrollment. In that paper, they note that school segregation will likely increase gradually 
after release from orders, as school districts may take some time phasing out desegregation 
orders, and because some parents may opt to keep their children in the same schools they 
started in for the rest of their time in schools. Projected changes in both of my outcomes 
 ix 
 
depend largely on school resegregation taking place and a consequent re-sorting of 
students by race.  
I expect that Black residents of terminated districts will experience worse outcomes 
than Black residents in non-terminated districts. This is because (1) resegregation of 
schools will likely bring with it a change in the distribution of school resources available to 
students, as resources are routed away from segregated Black schools to segregated White 
schools in a reversal of the process Johnson (2011) described following school 
desegregation, and (2) because changes in school attendance schemes likely brought with 
them changes in the demand for housing in residentially segregated neighborhoods, 
driving down the assessed value of Black-owned homes in Black neighborhoods. I expect 
either the reverse among White residents, as (1) segregated White schools gain access to 
more school resources, and (2) as demand increases for housing in segregated White 
neighborhoods.  
To provide context for the papers that come, Figures i-1 through i-3 are visual 
representations of the spread of terminated orders over time. In each of these figures, each 
outlined area represents a school district that was at some point subject to a desegregation 





Figure i-1: Spread of Desegregation Order Terminations Among all School Districts Ever 
Under Desegregation Order, 1990 – 1999. 
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Figure i-2: Spread of Desegregation Order Terminations Among all School Districts Ever 








Figure i-3: Spread of Desegregation Order Terminations Among all School Districts Ever 
Under Desegregation Order, 2010 – 2013. 
 
 
 Table i-1 shows the timing of desegregation order dismissals, as well as the total 
number of districts that have been dismissed from orders by 2013: 
Table i-1: Timing of Desegregation Order Terminations 
Year of 
Dismissal Freq. %  
Year of 
Dismissal Freq. %  
Year of 
Dismissal Freq. % 
                   
1967 1 0.23  1984 6 1.4  2000 10 2.33 
1969 1 0.23  1985 6 1.4  2001 8 1.86 
1970 3 0.7  1986 1 0.23  2002 24 5.58 
1971 4 0.93  1987 4 0.93  2003 24 5.58 
1972 7 1.63  1988 3 0.7  2004 18 4.19 
1973 1 0.23  1989 3 0.7  2005 31 7.21 
1974 3 0.7  1990 2 0.47  2006 36 8.37 
1975 1 0.23  1991 4 0.93  2007 38 8.84 
1976 2 0.47  1992 3 0.7  2008 25 5.81 
1977 13 3.02  1993 2 0.47  2009 19 4.42 
1978 2 0.47  1994 5 1.16  2010 7 1.63 
1979 9 2.09  1995 7 1.63  2011 5 1.16 
1980 2 0.47  1996 6 1.4  2012 6 1.4 
1981 3 0.7  1997 8 1.86  2013 7 1.63 
1982 3 0.7  1998 29 6.74        
1983 6 1.4  1999 22 5.12       





Paper one investigates factors shaping districts’ choices to pursue release from 
desegregation orders once it became expedient to do so. This serves to provide context for 
papers two and three, and to outline whether there are systematic differences between 
school districts that were released from orders and those that were not. Paper two tests 
whether release from court ordered desegregation orders coincided with racially disparate 
changes in elementary and middle school test scores. Paper three presents an analysis of 
how property taxes – an indicator of housing values - responded to release from 






What Predicts School District Release from Desegregation Orders? 
Introduction: 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, America was as close to seeing the promise of racial equality 
fulfilled as it had been during any period since the Reconstruction. The widespread 
implementation of court-ordered desegregation plans was in full swing, initiated by the 
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ruling in 1954.  For the first time in 
generations, Black and White children were required to share schools and all of their 
concomitant resources. The segregation that had characterized the American public school 
system since its inception steadily decreased (Cascio, et al., 2008; Guryan, 2004; Lutz, 2011). 
As a result, Black students became less likely to drop out of high school (Guryan, 2004) or 
get caught engaging in criminal activities (Weiner, et al., 2009).  This did not last. 
In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell 
that once school districts were declared unitary (that is, not separated into racially defined 
sub-districts), they could be permanently released from court oversight. Freeman v. Pitts 
(1992), another Supreme Court case, made it easier for districts to qualify as unitary. 
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) limited the power of federal courts to enforce integration orders 
and emphasized that release to local control of school districts should be the end goal of all 
desegregation plans. As a result of these three rulings, hundreds of school districts, more 
than half of all ever under court orders to begin and maintain desegregation, were eventually 
released from court oversight. By the mid-1990s, it was easier than it had been in nearly half 
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a century for schools to be free from federal mandates to induce and maintain racial 
integration. 
In this paper, I present an analysis of how school districts responded to this change 
in desegregation policy enforcement. I investigate factors that shaped districts’ choices to 
pursue unitary status after the Missouri V. Jenkins decision of 1995.  I do this in order to set 
the stage for my later analysis of the effects of slackening desegregation enforcement on 
student outcomes, and see if there are systematic differences between school districts that 
were granted unitary status and those that were not. In addition to shedding light on the 
finer points of desegregation policy dynamics, I intend for this quantitative study to 




 In 1968, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, the 
Supreme Court agreed on decisive judicial action to end school segregation. Until that point, 
southern school districts could claim that they had made efforts toward the desegregation 
Brown I and Brown II mandated by implementing district-wide “freedom of choice” plans. In 
these, students could opt into transferring from majority Black schools into White ones. The 
idea was, given the opportunity to integrate schools, Black students and families would be 
willing and able to desegregate through their own individual actions. In practice, this proved 




In Green, the courts shifted the onus of desegregation from the Black students 
experiencing it to the school districts imposing it, ruling that racial segregation be 
dismantled “root and branch” in affected districts. Under this ruling, segregated dual school 
systems (consisting of separate Black and White systems) were to be unified across 
dimensions of “facilities, staff, faculty, extracurricular activities, and transportation” in 
addition to student racial composition, else they be subject to desegregation enforcement or 
were forced to remain under the supervision mandated by existing orders (Orfield & Eaton, 
1996). These dimensions came to be known as the Green factors. 
 Over time, however, the purpose of the Green factors shifted. Riddick v. School Board 
of the City of Norfolk Virginia, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) set a legal precedent, allowing 
school districts that had been declared unitary to cease following desegregation plans in 
place and return to local control of school affairs. Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237 (1991) took the thread of dismantling desegregation plans even further, with 
the Court upholding the Oklahoma City school district’s decision to return to segregated 
neighborhood schooling after having been declared unitary. An important blow to the power 
of desegregation orders was dealt in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), which allowed 
school districts to be released from desegregation plans even if they had only partially 
satisfied the requirements laid out by Green. Missouri v. Jenkins 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), 
limited the power of federal courts to enforce integration orders and emphasized that 
release to local control of school districts should be the end goal of all desegregation plans.  
 In their original form, the Green factors were a sharply defined list of indicators 
wielded by the federal government in order to precisely measure progress towards 
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integration. In their current form, they are a collection of sufficient, but not necessary, states 
that districts can choose from in order to demonstrate that they have earned return to local 
control. In theory, these factors are supposed to demonstrate that integration has been 
achieved and that districts no longer require federal supervision. However, since districts 
need only demonstrate partial progress towards fulfillment of the kind of desegregation 
outlined by Green factors, the current role of these factors in having districts declared unitary 
is unknown. 
 In this paper, I examine how well student integration, arguably the most important 
Green Factor, explains district dismissals. I also examine the extent to which other factors, 
unrelated to integration, play roles in the obtainment of unitary status.  
 
Interviews 
  In addition to evidence gleaned from secondary sources, I conducted a number of 
short interviews with key informants in order to better understand the dynamics of recent 
enforcement and retrenchment, and to validate the covariates included in later analyses. 
Several experts on desegregation policy agreed to speak with me, including Mark Dorosin, 
former Managing Attorney at the UNC Center for Civil rights, and frequent overseer of 
litigation in the defense of desegregation in North Carolina; John Kucsera, former Senior 
Research Associate for the Civil Rights Project at UCLA; and Anurima Bhargava, the former 
Chief of the Educational Opportunities Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. 





 I asked all key informants the same set of questions: (1) “How does the process of 
getting released from desegregation orders work? What actor or actors initiate the process?” 
(2) “How likely are districts to be released from orders once they request release?” (3) “Can 
you think of any factors that might make some school districts more likely to seek release 
from orders than others?” (4) “Has the process of getting released from orders changed over 
time?” and (5) “Is there anything else that you would like to add?”    
A few patterns emerged from the short interviews I conducted. The shifting nature of 
desegregation policy over time was frequently touched upon. As might be expected based on 
a cursory knowledge of the legislation mentioned above, older cases that resulted in the 
dismissal of desegregation orders looked very different from more recent cases. Until about 
1992, the test for continuance of orders was whether or not the school districts in question 
had fulfilled all 6 of the Green factors. After Freeman v. Pitt (1992), districts could be declared 
partially unitary, often if they minimally demonstrated some “good faith” effort to achieve 
desegregation, regardless of whether or not they actually had. On the ground, this meant that 
if school districts could show that they made some effort to desegregate, they could be 
released from any responsibility to fully integrate going forward. This discretionary good 
faith requirement came to be more and more important in deciding whether or not to declare 
districts unitary, eventually superseding total fulfilment of Green factors as the primary 
determinant of case dismissals.  
 Courts often took into account how much time had passed since order initiation when 
deciding whether to grant unitary status. Mark Dorosin mentioned a growing tendency 
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among courts to acknowledge that while district-level racial inequalities still exist, since in 
many cases a great deal of time has passed, it is extremely difficult to causally link current 
school demographic patterns to any actions on the part of school districts, thus exculpating 
districts from the realities of school segregation. The older an order, the more likely he 
predicted a district would be to see a dismissal.   
 In general, the experts that I spoke with characterized the granting of unitary status 
as a mostly random process, and were unable to think of any characteristics that 
systematically made some districts more likely than others to seek unitary status. When 
pressed, the general consensus was that districts that had been under order for longer were 
more likely to seek dismissal, and that districts close to others that had been granted unitary 
status were likely to seek it for themselves.  
 
Demographics 
 Though none of the experts interviewed mentioned it, demographic characteristics of 
districts might predict decisions to seek unitary status. For example, the percentage voting 
republican in presidential elections – an indicator of the political climate, might explain 
decisions to terminate existing desegregation orders. Greenwald and co-authors (2009) 
found that scores on an implicit racial attitudes test predicted voting behavior in the 2008 
election. If districts are composed of people who have negative attitudes towards minorities, 
this might show up as a high percentage voting republican. 
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There is a long literature on racial demographics and White flight. Card and Rothstein 
(2008) found that in most cities, once the percentage of minorities reached a certain 
threshold (somewhere between 5 and 20%), White residents moved out en masse. In light 
of this, percentages of minorities in districts might play some role in signaling to White 
residents that it is time to resegregate schools. If resources are limited and people identify 
with their own racial/ethnic group, then it would make sense that a higher share of 
minorities would signal to White residents that they need take action to protect their 
allocation of public resources. 
 Local economic indicators might also provide useful information. Higher levels of 
unemployment and poverty might indicate that an area is in need of intervention; residents 
and officials may be hesitant to seek unitary status, believing that surrendering ongoing 
intervention might cause local conditions to further deteriorate. Residents in high-
unemployment/high-poverty areas, more likely to be economically and socially vulnerable, 
might foresee long-term benefits from social programs (see Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989), and 
support the presence of programs targeted at improving the lives of people like them. 
Alternatively, areas in dire financial states might assume that the current local political and 
legislative configuration is part of what is causing high unemployment or high poverty and 
conclude that change is necessary to improve local conditions; in this scenario, poorer areas 







 In light of comments made by policy experts during interviews, it is useful to 
investigate whether or not proximity to dismissed districts informs the likelihood of another 
district being declared unitary. Perhaps in the process of changing desegregation oversight, 
districts learn from each other. Shipan and Volden (2008, 2012) describe a process of policy 
diffusion in which cities are more likely to adopt policies that have already been adopted by 
nearby cities, especially if there is economic competition between them, or if states coerce 
cities within them to adopt particular policies.  As many of the districts examined in this 
paper are clustered near each other, this research project provides a good opportunity to 
investigate whether or not policy diffusion occurred with desegregation order dismissals.   
 
Time 
Finally, many of the lawyers and researchers I spoke with considered the age of 
orders a primary determinant in decisions to seek unitary status; perhaps desegregation 
orders have an expiration date.  
 
Hypotheses: 
I address 4 distinct hypotheses: 




(2) District-level demographics are the primary determinant in being granted unitary 
status 
(3) Proximity to dismissed districts is the primary determinant in being granted unitary 
status 
(4) Time is the primary determinant in being granted unitary status 
 
Data, Measures, and Methods: 
 Data for this project come from multiple sources. Desegregation order end dates for 
all orders initiated between 1954-2014, district and county identifiers, and indicators of 
whether or not districts were ever subject to a federal desegregation order are from 
ProPublica’s School Desegregation Orders data (SDOD) archive, the most comprehensive 
publicly available dataset of court-ordered desegregation orders in the U.S. available at the 
time of writing. It consists of information gathered from the U.S. Department of Education, 
Department of Justice, Stanford University, and ProPublica research. 
All district covariates (aside from election results, available every 4 years, 2004-
2012) cover each year, 2009-2013, are from the Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA) 
and were merged on by district. SEDA is a database containing socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of nearly all school districts in the United States, originally 
pulled from the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD), the School District Demographics System 
(SDDS), and the Census’s American Community Survey (ACS). Information for 13,069 
distinct school districts are included in SEDA.  
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Order initiation dates are from Brown University’s American Communities Project 
(ACP) desegregation court cases and school demographic data segregation case files.  These 
data are a collection of every court case and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) action regarding desegregation listed separately by school district (n = 2,124).  
Geographic location data (centroid latitudes and longitudes of districts) were pulled 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 unified school districts gazetteer files, a database of 
characteristics of school districts abstracted from the 2010 ACS and standardized to adhere 
to school district boundaries. Election data comes from the CQ Voting and Elections 
Collection presidential election data files for 2004, 2008, and 2012.  These data are made up 
of all election results for the presidential elections of those years, including the percentage 
of voters in counties who voted for either the Republican or Democratic presidential 
nominee.  
County-level unemployment data comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local 
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 2009-2012 files. Each county housing a school district 
was assigned an average unemployment rate. District-level 5-17 poverty statistics are from 
the Census’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) for school districts, 2009-
2012. Each district was assigned a poverty rate. 
 The ProPublica data on desegregation orders is the most comprehensive and up-to-
date list available of school districts ever under desegregation orders (n=768). This database 
was merged to the SEDA database of school district level covariates using school district 
identifiers for every year, 2009-2013. Further information on order initiation timing was 
merged on from the ACP. Geographic location and election data were merged on next. 
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Counties with more than one school district were excluded in order to ensure that counties 
included in the analysis sample were as similar as possible, and to ensure that in cases when 
data was only available at the county level, it made sense to attach them to school districts; 
this way, county and district characteristics could be used interchangeably. Finally, districts 
whose desegregation orders did not start in the 1960s or 1970s were dropped in order to 
create comparable comparison groups; districts placed under desegregation orders after 
this period exhibited characteristics markedly different from those of earlier integration 
adopters. The resulting analytic sample was composed of a 5-year sample made up only of 
districts ever under federal desegregation orders for which complete desegregation order 
initiation, dismissal, and district covariates were available. 341 unique districts were 
included, which expanded into 1,705 observations; 805 were among late-dismissed districts 
(see below), and 900 were of districts still under orders. 
 All districts were classified by the timing of order dismissals. Districts were classified 
as being dismissed either during the early (1954-1979), middle (1980-1994), or late (1995-
2014) period, or as not dismissed.   
 The early group is made up of districts whose most recent order dismissal was 
granted between 1954, the year that Brown v. Board was decided, and 1979, two years after 
Milliken v. Bradley. Milliken was the last federal court order whose explicit purpose was to 
combat racial segregation in schools. This period, from 1954-1967, can be thought of as the 
early period of desegregation orders, characterized by court decisions mandating that states 
and districts take action to dismantle segregated school systems; the desegregation regime 
during this period could be called pro-desegregation. The middle group, made up of districts 
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that were granted return to local control between 1980 and 1994, can be thought of as the 
group of districts released during the beginning of desegregation retrenchment. Riddick 
(1986) allowed school districts to be declared unitary and dismantle their desegregation 
plans once they had demonstrated desegregation. Other court decisions handed down 
during this period (Dowell, Freeman v. Pitts, and Missouri v. Jenkins) all had the effect of 
making it easier for districts to be declared unitary and have their orders dismissed. By 1995, 
the beginning of the late period, the groundwork had been laid for easy dismissals - this is 
the period when the vast majority of orders were dismissed. This is the current period, 
characterized by an emphasis on ending extant orders.  
 For this and future analyses, there are two groups of interest: districts currently 
under desegregation orders and a comparison group made up of districts that were once 
under orders but are not anymore. Of the three groups not under orders, I use the late 
districts as the comparison group. I do this because, of the four groups, these two most 
closely resemble each other in timing of order initiation, proximity to dismissed orders, 
racial and economic segregation, voting patterns, poverty rates, racial composition, school 
size, and in the number of districts contained within (see Table 1-1). Also, the earlier two 
dismissed groups (early and middle) likely differ in unobservable ways from the youngest 
group, both in district level characteristics and, most importantly, in the dominant legal 





Table 1-1: Median characteristics of districts by time of dismissal 
  Early Mid Late 
Not 
Dismissed 
  (1954-1979) (1980-1994) (1995-2014)   
Year placed 1970 1970 1969 1969 
Year lifted 1974 1985 2006   
Order Age 6 16 37 48 
Of 5 nearest d, how many lifted 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 
Segregation (info index)       
Black/White 0.16 0.2 0.05 0.05 
Hispanic/White 0.1 0.11 0.04 0.04 
Free lunch/Not Free Lunch 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.03 
% voting republican in…       
2004 55.4 58.2 58.0 58.2 
2008 51.0 54.9 55.8 56.1 
2012 52.1 53.2 56.0 56.5 
Unemployment rate 9.6 8.3 10.0 9.6 
Poverty rate 24.3 28.0 29.0 28.9 
% Black 40.6 29.5 38.8 40.0 
% Hispanic 7.3 7.2 3.8 3.6 
% White 48.8 30.4 45.9 50.4 
Per grade enrollment 1520 1903 281 288 
% in South (mean) 96.8 87.1 97.8 89.4 
n =  155 155 805 905 
 
 Analysis variables were created in this manner: The proportion of nearby districts 
that had seen order dismissals was calculated by using latitude and longitude data in 
combination with Stata’s geonear package to find each school district’s 5 closest district 
neighbors ever under order (distances ranged from 3- 506 miles, with the median distance 
to a neighbor of 24 miles). For each year, the number of these districts that were dismissed 
was divided by 5, yielding the proportion of nearby districts that were dismissed.  
 Black/White segregation was operationalized using Theil’s (1972) information 
theory index. These were computed by SEDA researchers and are the average deviation of 
each student’s school racial diversity from the district-wide racial diversity. As an example, 
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if a district had a score of 0, this would indicate no segregation between Black and White 
students. A value of 1 would indicate total segregation.  
 An average of the percent voting republican in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential 
elections was created for each district. Each district was also coded as being either a southern 
state or not, and as urban or not. 
 All coefficients are odds ratios, obtained via logistic regression. Standard errors were 
clustered by district using the VCE command in Stata 14. All of my continuous predictors 
(with the exception of proportion of nearby districts dismissed) were broken down into 
quintiles in order to rule out non-monotonic effects, and were included in the model as 
categorical variables. All covariates, with the exception of decade of initiation, southern 
status, and urban status vary by year and are included in the analysis 5 times, once for each 
year of observation. The margins command was used to compute predicted probabilities of 
dismissals at selected levels of predictors. Margins are based off of models estimated using 
continuous versions of all included variables.  
Results: 
 In order to investigate predictors of order dismissal, I obtained results from a logistic 
regression with an indicator of dismissal as the outcome. The predictors were decade of 
initiation; proportion of nearby districts dismissed; Black/White student segregation; 
Hispanic/White student segregation; percentage voting republican; unemployment rate; 5-
17 poverty rate; % Black, White, and Hispanic; region of the U.S. (southern or not); and 
whether or not districts were located in urban areas.  Since each district appears in my 
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dataset 5 times (one observation per district, per year, 2009-2013), I clustered standard 
errors at the district level in order avoid artificially deflating standard errors.  
 Overall, it appears that these predictors in combination with each other wield some 
power in explaining districts’ dismissal behavior. The chi-square statistic here (58.4, at 36 
degrees of freedom, p = 0.01) indicates that the variables included in my model do a 
significantly better job of explaining what districts look like when they are dismissed than 
would a null model in which they in combination held no explanatory power. Further, the 
pseudo R-squared statistic (10.75) for this analysis indicates that this model is useful in 
explaining the variation in order dismissals. Coefficient estimates were robust across a 
number of different specifications (logistic, LPM, using 5 year averages, and using continuous 
versions of indicator variables).  
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Table 1-2: Desegregation Order Dismissal Predictors for Late Dismissers (Odds Ratios) 
  Odds Ratio CI (95%) 
Decade of Initiation    
60s (ref)   
70s  0.96 (0.58 - 1.57) 
Proportion of Nearby Districts Dismissed 5.74*** (2.28 - 14.5) 
Black/White Segregation    
2nd quintile 0.62 (0.090 - 4.28) 
3rd quintile 0.36 (0.049 - 2.68) 
4th quintile 0.32 (0.041 - 2.54) 
5th quintile 0.36 (0.044 - 3.02) 
Hispanic/White Segregation    
2nd quintile 1.52 (0.22 - 10.5) 
3rd quintile 1.41 (0.20 - 10.2) 
4th quintile 2.00 (0.27 - 14.6) 
5th quintile 2.54 (0.32 - 20.3) 
% Voting Republican, 04-12    
2nd quintile 1.87 (0.78 - 4.47) 
3rd quintile 1.08 (0.43 - 2.69) 
4th quintile 2.45* (0.87 - 6.90) 
5th quintile 1.48 (0.49 - 4.52) 
Unemployment Rate    
2nd quintile 1.03 (0.66 - 1.63) 
3rd quintile 1.13 (0.66 - 1.91) 
4th quintile 1.14 (0.64 - 2.01) 
5th quintile 1.13 (0.60 - 2.10) 
5-17 Poverty Rate    
2nd quintile 1.81* (0.91 - 3.59) 
3rd quintile 1.76 (0.86 - 3.61) 
4th quintile 1.20 (0.55 - 2.61) 
5th quintile 2.33* (0.95 - 5.75) 
Percent Black    
2nd quintile 1.17 (0.53 - 2.60) 
3rd quintile 2.08 (0.75 - 5.78) 
4th quintile 1.62 (0.49 - 5.37) 
5th quintile 2.47 (0.48 - 12.6) 
Percent Hispanic    
2nd quintile 1.26 (0.69 - 2.31) 
3rd quintile 0.95 (0.48 - 1.88) 
4th quintile 1.25 (0.58 - 2.66) 
5th quintile 3.62* (1.30 - 10.1) 
Percent White    
2nd quintile 1.27 (0.46 - 3.55) 
3rd quintile 0.76 (0.23 - 2.46) 
4th quintile 0.82 (0.21 - 3.13) 
5th quintile 2.06 (0.41 - 10.3) 
In south? 3.73*** (1.42 - 9.82) 
Urban? 1.69 (0.79 - 3.60) 
Intercept 0.020*** (0.0021 - 0.19) 
Pseudo R-squared   10.75 
Wald chi2 (36df)  58.4 
P  0.0105 
N =   1,661 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Comparison groups are school districts still under desegregation orders 




Looking at individual coefficients helps to sketch out a more nuanced story. Districts 
were considerably more likely to have their orders dismissed if they were near a higher 
proportion of districts that had dismissed their own orders. The odds of dismissal for a 
district that whose 5 closest neighbors were released from orders were nearly 6 times as 
large as that of a district near no dismissed districts. Also of note, districts in Southern states 
had nearly 4 times the odds of having orders dismissed than non-Southern districts (though 
this should be taken with a grain of salt, as the sample is overwhelmingly composed of 
Southern districts). Nearly none of the other coefficients are statistically significant, though 
many are greater than one; a few also exhibit only marginal statistical significance.  Further, 
the confidence intervals of individual quintiles of variables overlap with each other in all 
cases, even when individual quintile estimates exhibit statistical significance (as is the case 
with quintile 2 of percentage voting republican, and quintiles 2 and 5 of the 5-17 poverty 
rate). Based on this, it seems that the only district covariates that have a significant impact 
on dismissal status are the proportion of nearby districts dismissed and whether or not 
districts are located in Southern states.   
 Since odds ratios are often unwieldy to interpret, it is useful to extend the analysis by 
using the data to predict the probability of dismissals at specific levels of predictors. Stata’s 
margins command does this handily, allowing me to set each predictor at a level I choose 
while holding all other predictors at their means. Table 1-3 presents predicted probabilities 
of dismissal obtained by fixing all variables at their means except for one, which is shifted to 




Table 1-3: Predicted Probabilities of Dismissal at Selected Levels of Significant Predictors 
  Value Prob. Difference CI (95%) of Diff. 
All Set at Mean   0.46    
       
Decade of initiation 60s 0.45 ref   
  70s  0.46 0.01 (-.10, .13) 
       
Proportion of nearby districts dismissed 0 0.24 ref   
  1/5 0.32 0.08 (.04, .09) 
  2/5 0.40 0.16 (.09, .21) 
  3/5 0.49 0.25 (.13, .34) 
  4/5 0.58 0.34 (.18, .47) 
  5/5 0.66 0.42 (.23, .59) 
       
Black/White segregation .01 0.49    
  .16 0.44 -0.05 (-.14, .03) 
       
Hispanic/White segregation .01 0.42    
  .12 0.48 0.06 (-.03, .16) 
       
% Voting Republican 25% 0.41    
  75% 0.49 0.08 (-.27, .43) 
       
5 - 17 Poverty Rate 10% 0.30    
  35% 0.51 0.21 (.03, .38) 
       
Percent Hispanic 1% 0.54    
  20% 0.36 -0.18 (-.53, .16) 
       
Percent Black 25% 0.63    
  75% 0.17 -0.46 (-1.08, .15) 
       
Percent White 25% 0.68    
  75% 0.20 -0.48 (-1.18, .21) 
       
Region Non-South 0.23    
  South 0.48 0.25 (.07, .43) 
       
In urban area? Yes 0.57    
  No 0.43 -0.14 (-.31, .03) 
 
 First, a caveat: the confidence intervals for differences in Table 1-3 are relatively 
wide, though they do generally confirm the statistical significance of the predictors seen in 
Table 1-2. This is not surprising, given the heterogeneity of districts in the sample. The 
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differences in probability reported here are best viewed as approximate descriptions of 
effects.  
 The average district in my sample was Southern, not urban, placed under 
desegregation order in the 1960s, had a proportion of nearby districts dismissed between .4 
and .5, had a Black/White student segregation index of about .10 and a Hispanic/White 
student segregation index of about .07, a percentage voting republican of about 56%, an 
unemployment rate of about 10%, a child poverty rate of 28%, a district percent Black of 
about 41, percent Hispanic of about 10, and a percent White of about 46. With every variable 
in the model set at its mean, the probability of a district having an order dismissed is 0.46. 
All else equal, districts that initiated their most recent desegregation orders in the 1970s 
were about 1 probability point more likely to have their orders dismissed by 2014 than those 
initiated in the 1960s.   
As the proportion of nearby districts with dismissals rises, so too does the probability 
of a district’s own dismissal, fairly uniformly. If a district is not near any dismissed districts, 
the probability of dismissal is 0.24. If one out of five nearby districts is dismissed, that 
probability rises to 0.32. Two out of five districts equated to a probability of 0.40, three out 
of five yields 0.49, four out of five results in 0.58, and being completely surrounded by 
dismissed districts yields a predicted probability of 0.68. Similarly, an otherwise average 
district located outside of the South would have a predicted probability of dismissal of 0.23. 
An average district in the South, however, has a predicted probability of dismissal of 0,48, a 
sharp increase.  
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 The remaining columns in Table 1-3 report predicted probabilities for predictors that 
were not significant or were marginally significant in the main model.  
Discussion: 
The districts in my sample were all subject to the same desegregation orders and 
faced a similar policy landscape in which seeking unitary status was a possible route of 
action. However, only some of them sought and were granted release from desegregation 
orders. In general, the decision to seek unitary status appears to be a function of social, 
temporal, and geographic characteristics of school districts. 
The single most significant predictor in my model is the proportion of nearby districts 
already dismissed from desegregation orders. Based on this proportion, once at least four 
nearby districts are dismissed, districts face a greater likelihood of having their own order 
dismissed than not. Once most of the nearby districts are dismissed (3 out of 5), districts 
have about a .50 probability of being declared unitary. If a district is completely surrounded 
by dismissed districts, then there is a 0.66 probability of that district having its own 
desegregation order dismissed.  Southern districts were also considerably more likely to 
have their orders dismissed. 
This is evidence that school districts influence each other, and that the more common 
it is in a larger area to seek unitary status, the more likely any smaller area under an order 
will be to attempt to free themselves of federal oversight. Further, it implies that 




Since percent Black and White in districts were not significantly related to dismissals, 
there appears to be at best limited evidence that the racial composition of schools is a 
meaningful predictor of deciding to seek unitary status. The percent Hispanic in a district, 
however, does seem to help predict whether or not a district will have its desegregation 
order terminated, though only marginally so. 
Most importantly, neither of my indices of Black/White and Hispanic/White 
segregation were significantly related to the likelihood of districts having their orders 
overturned, implying that the Green Factor mandate to only release districts that had 
achieved desegregation is not, in practice, the primary driver of recent dismissals. Districts 
that had both high and low levels of racial segregation faced similar probabilities of having 
their orders dismissed.  
One important finding is that when everything is set at sample means, the probability 
of dismissal is about half, at .46. So, regardless of individual district characteristics, if a school 
district had been under order at some point in the past 22 years, it was about as likely as not 








School Desegregation Retrenchment and Black/White Test Score Differences 
Introduction: 
As outlined in the previous chapter, school desegregation policy in the United States is 
now a shadow of its former self. A series of federal court decision in the 1950s and 1960s 
mandated racial integration of many of America's racially segregated schools and required 
school districts to make efforts to maintain desegregation in order to continue receiving 
federal educational aid funds.  These efforts were successful, resulting in less segregated 
schools, as well as better later life outcomes for Black students (Cascio, et al., 2008; Guryan, 
2004; Lutz, 2011; Weiner, et al., 2009). Beginning in the 1990s, the court orders 
underpinning continued desegregation enforcement were systematically weakened, 
resulting in a policy regime that encouraged easy discharge from federal desegregation 
oversight. Hundreds of school districts, more than half of all of those ever subject to 
desegregation orders, were relieved of the responsibility to maintain integrated schools. 
Following this policy change, racial segregation of schools gradually rose (Lutz, 2011; 
Reardon, 2012).  
Currently, that is about all we know about the effects of the changing landscape of 
desegregation enforcement - that it coincided with resegregation of schools. What the 
consequences of school resegregation were for the educational experiences of students 
remains unknown. The goal of this paper is to test whether release from court ordered 
desegregation orders coincided with racially disparate changes in a standardized marker of 
educational performance - test scores of Black and White students in elementary and 
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middle school. I find that test scores among White students in affected districts increased 
about 10 years after release, while test scores among Black students also increased, but at a 
much lower rate than those of White students. As a result of these two patterns, the 
White/Black gap in test scores widened over time.  
Effects of Desegregation 
In order to understand the effects of ending enforcement of desegregation plans, it is 
useful to first understand what initial desegregation plans were effective in bringing about. 
Guryan (2004) found that one year after the implementation of desegregation plans, 
districts saw, on average, a 15 percentage point increase in their likelihoods of Black 
students’ exposure to White students and a sharp decline in the Black-White dissimilarity 
index (a measure of the evenness of distribution of Black and White students across a 
district), both of which persisted for at least 10 years post-implementation. This is 
consistent with other findings of decreases in school segregation by race following court 
orders in the late 1960s and 1970s (Cascio et al., 2008; Coleman et al., 1975; Johnson, 
2011). To illustrate - in 1968, immediately before desegregation plans rolled out in full 
force, 77% of Black students attended schools made up of at least 90% other Black 
students. By 1980, after desegregation orders had been in full swing for more than a 
decade, this number was down to about 30% (Reardon & Owens, 2014).  
School integration was not the only effect these plans brought about, however. The 
desegregation plans implemented in the 1970s brought with them a 2-3 percentage point 
reduction in Black dropout rates coupled with no change in White dropout rates (Guryan, 
2004). Johnson (2011) found that court-ordered desegregation brought with it increases in 
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per-pupil spending, reductions in class size, and increased attendance at colleges with 
higher average SAT scores - all among Black students with no concurrent change among 
White students in the same districts. The study also found effects on a number of later life 
outcomes, including increased annual wages and earnings, increased likelihoods of being 
married, and decreased likelihood of experiencing poverty as an adult, with each year of 
exposure to desegregating schools translating to an approximate increase of $1,000 in 
family income.   
In large urban school districts subject to court orders, both Black homicide 
victimization and arrests declined significantly after desegregation (Weiner et al., 2009). 
Further, attending a desegregated school was associated with a 22 percentage point 
reduction in the probability of being incarcerated as an adult for any reason among Black 
students who attended desegregated elementary schools (Johnson, 2011). Analysis of a 
recent court ordered desegregation plan in California found that minority students who 
transferred away from desegregated schools faced an increased likelihood of arrest 
afterwards (Bergman, 2016). 
Of note, many of the studies mentioned above point out that the effects of desegregation 
on these outcomes existed most strongly for students who were exposed earlier on in their 
education, usually in elementary school (Cascio et al., 2008; Johnson, 2011).  There appears 
to be a rough dose-response relationship between years of exposure to court-ordered 
desegregation and most outcomes as well.  
Effects of resegregation  
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While newer as a subfield of analysis and, consequently, narrower in scope than studies 
of the effects of desegregation, some enlightening work has been done on the effects of 
reversals of court ordered desegregation plans. Sean Reardon and coauthors (2012) 
examined how school segregation responded to order terminations and found that school 
districts gradually resegregated after release from court order, with segregation increasing 
for at least 10 years post-dismissal. Of note, they found that resegregation took hold more 
firmly in Southern states, and in lower grades. Byron Lutz (2011) uncovered similar 
findings, outlining moderate increases in school racial segregation after release from 
desegregation orders. 
Researchers have also found evidence of desegregation reversal affecting the likelihood 
of engaging in criminal behavior among students affected. Billings and coauthors (2012) 
found that after court-ordered busing came to an end in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg School 
system (CMS) in North Carolina, minority males who were assigned to schools with high 
proportions of other minority students became much more likely to be arrested and 
incarcerated. These researchers found no evidence of changes in high school graduation 
rates for minorities affected by the elimination of busing in CMS, though they did find 
evidence of higher dropout rates among poor non-minorities.  
All students, regardless of race, were more likely to score lower on high school exams 
once re-assigned to schools with higher proportions of minorities in CMS. Notably, a study 
of the end of court ordered desegregation plans in Nashville found no effects on student 
achievement consequent to attending schools with higher proportions of Black students; 
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instead, it found that exposure to increased proportions of low-income students reduced 
test scores (Gamoran, 2016).  
Proposed Mechanisms: 
 There are a few ways that terminating desegregation orders may have affected 
student educational outcomes. Johnson's (2011) analysis of the effects of desegregation 
enforcement in the 1960s through 1980s outlines how desegregation brought with it 
increased per-pupil spending, lower racial segregation, and lower student-teacher ratios 
for Black students.  White students also attended less segregated schools, but saw no 
significant gains in spending or class size. Johnson explains these different effects by 
theorizing that since school spending before desegregation disproportionately favored 
White students (who attended segregated White schools), once school districts became 
aware that they would be forced to integrate, they were placed under political pressure to 
maintain White students' pre-integration per-pupil funding levels. Since districts could not 
cherry pick which students to provide better funding for, in practice this meant that the 
only way to maintain White students' funding levels was to ensure that all students, 
regardless of race, received funding equal to the level of pre-integration White students. 
States routed more money into districts that were integrating so that Black students would 
be funded at the same level as White students. Thus, per-pupil spending for White students 
remained the same while spending for Black students increased. A similar pattern was 
found in class sizes, with Black students on average seeing a reduction in class size, while 
White student class size remained constant. 
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 A similar process was likely at work when schools began to resegregate. School 
districts would be able to maintain the same level of average funding at the district level 
while re-routing funds away from segregated Black schools back to segregated White 
schools. The same political forces at work that demanded that White students not be 
harmed by integration would similarly demand that disparities in per-pupil funding 
returned once Black and White students were separated. Also, the parent bases of 
segregated Black and White schools would have different capacities for raising 
supplementary funds for schools, which might also result in disparities in student funding 
by race. Lower per pupil spending for Black students would likely equate to general poorer 
quality of schooling, which would manifest as poorer test scores. White students would 
likely see either no change in test scores, or improvement on average.  
It is implausible that any effects on educational outcomes would manifest 
immediately. A school district would first have to resegregate, which according to Reardon 
(2012) would begin to occur a few years after order termination, and would increase for at 
least 10 years after that. This is further complicated by the issue of length of exposure to 
segregated schools - some students in school districts would have attended integrated 
schools for most of their school careers, while others in the same districts at different 
points of observation would have attended segregated schools for most of the duration of 
their schooling. Studies of desegregation (Cascio et al., 2008; Johnson, 2011) have noted 
that effects of integration appeared strongest for students first exposed in elementary 
school. I expect for this to be the case in this study as well - that students who would have 
been exposed to resegregating schools earlier (i.e. those observed in higher years of school 
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at least 10 years post-termination) would exhibit the largest effects. Conversely, I would 
not expect students who would not have had time to be exposed to resegregation to exhibit 
changes in average test scores. 
Based on the above proposed mechanisms, in this chapter, I test 3 hypotheses: 
1. On average, Black test scores will decrease after order termination.  
2. On average, White test scores will not decrease after order termination. 
3. On average, the gap between Black and White test scores will increase after order 
termination. 
Data: 
 The main source of data for this paper is the Stanford Education Data Archive 
(SEDA), which contains detailed data on educational conditions, contexts, and outcomes for 
most of the school districts in the United States from 2009 through 2015. Of interest to this 
study, it contains estimates of the average Black and White scores on standardized tests in 
English/Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics in 3rd through 8th grade. It also contains 
data on a number of school district-level covariates, including estimates of the racial 
makeup of districts.  
Descriptions follow of key measures: 
Average test scores: Average test scores were available for each school district in each 
year, with one average score available per subject, per grade. States are required by federal 
law to provide aggregated test score data to the public, and this data was compiled by SEDA 
using the EDFacts system supplied by the U.S. Department of Education. Tests were 
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administered in the spring of each year, from the 2008-09 school year to the 2014-15 
school year in two subjects: English/Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics. Scores were 
standardized by SEDA in order to be comparable across states, grades, and years using data 
from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests to place all test scores 
on a common scale. Scores range from 168.8 to 356.8 in the analytic sample, and higher 
grades generally had higher average scores.  
School type: For each year, I classify scores as belonging to either elementary or middle 
schools. I do this in order to create the largest possible meaningful analytic subgroupings. 
Subject-specific test scores in grades 3-5 were pooled to create average elementary school 
scores and scores from grades 6-8 were pooled to make a middle school grouping.  
Subject: Scores were available for two subjects: English/Language Arts (ELA) and 
mathematics. Since NAEP standardized scores are not comparable across subjects, all 
average scores are examined separately by subject. 
Percent White and Black: The percent of White and Black students in each grade is 
included in regression models as a covariate. Data comes from SEDA and varies yearly. 
 
Methods: 
The dataset used in this paper is made up of school districts that either (1) were still 
under federal desegregation orders as of 2015 (N = 322), or (2) were once under federal 
desegregation orders but had those orders terminated at some point (N = 330). 
Desegregation order end dates for all orders initiated between 1954-2014, district 
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identifiers, and indicators of whether or not districts were ever subject to a federal 
desegregation order are from ProPublica’s School Desegregation Orders Data (SDOD) 
archive, the most comprehensive publicly available dataset of court-ordered desegregation 
orders in the U.S. available at the time of writing this. It consists of information gathered 
from the U.S. Department of Education, Department of Justice, Stanford University, and 
ProPublica research. 
Each district was assigned a year of dismissal based on the dates provided in the SDOD. 
Using that dismissal year, which is that district’s year 0, each district was assigned a year at 
observation for every year that it was observed in the SEDA. For instance, if a district’s 
desegregation order was dismissed in 2010, then its 2010 observation would be coded as 
year 0, its 2011 observation would be coded as year 1, its 2013 observation would be 
coded as year 3, its 2009 observation would be coded as year -1, and so on. 
Following this, each non-dismissed district in the dataset was matched to its most 
geographically proximal neighbor district that had its desegregation order terminated. This 
was done by using district centroid latitudes and longitudes in conjunction with the Stata 
package geonear. These control districts were then assigned a variable indicating the year 
of dismissal of their nearest neighbor.  Non-dismissed districts were matched to their 
nearest dismissed neighbors in order to create a geographically proximal comparison 
group to the group of dismissed counties, similar in local characteristics. 
 Most districts appear in the data 84 times: once per year (for 7 years), per subject (for 
2 subjects), and per grade (6 grades). Among the 322 non-dismissed districts, there are 
 31 
 
25,590 average year-subject-grade observations. Among the 300 dismissed districts, there 
are 26,722 average year-subject-grade observations.  
For every district in the dataset, mean subject/school type-specific test scores were 
calculated for a year before dismissal, during (year 0), and after release (up to year 17) 
from desegregation orders; these are the years for which there were observations for more 
than 20 districts per comparison group. Years -1, 0, 16, and 17 are shaded in graphs and 
tables to indicate that for these years, fewer than 50 districts per comparison group were 
observed, and to encourage caution in interpreting those estimates. For graphical analysis, 
average district scores were centered at the year that district’s order was dismissed. For 
example, if a district’s desegregation order was dismissed in 2012, that district’s year 0 
observation would be its 2012 mean (in a particular subject, for a particular school type).  
I begin with a visual analysis of trends in standardized test scores, comparing scores in 
dismissed versus non-dismissed districts over time. I then test regression-adjusted 
differences between dismissed and non-dismissed average scores using OLS regression. 
Beginning 1 year prior to termination, I analyze differences in scores between comparison 
groups for every year through year 17.  
In this study, I used Stata 15 to conduct all analyses. I analyze variation in average Black 
and White test scores, separately by subject and school type. I used OLS regression models 
to estimate adjusted differences in average test scores between dismissed and non-
dismissed districts. I adjust for yearly district percent Black and White, grade, and year of 
observation. I also include standard errors clustered at the district level using Stata 15’s 




 Table 2-1 shows characteristics of districts with terminated desegregation orders 
and of districts still under desegregation orders. Across all included metrics, the two types 
of districts exhibit characteristics closely resembling each other. Test scores in districts 
that had their orders terminated were slightly higher, and these districts had marginally 
higher percentages of White students. Percentages of Black students were slightly lower in 
terminated districts. 
Table 2-1: Characteristics of School Districts by Segregation Order Status 
  Under Orders 
Orders 
Terminated  
Mean White Math Scores, Elementary 240.67 242.53 
  (13.45) (13.67) 
Mean White ELA Scores, Elementary 223.08 225.52 
  (14.94) (15.21) 
Mean Black Math Scores, Elementary 222.29 222.81 
  (11.56) (11.93) 
Mean Black ELA Scores, Elementary 199.35 200.5 
  (13.09) (13.21) 
Mean White Math Scores, Middle 269.97 272.93 
  (14.79) (15.74) 
Mean White ELA Scores, Middle 254.61 256.47 
  (14.30) (14.79) 
Mean Black Math Scores, Middle 248.2 249.9 
  (12.31) (12.93) 
Mean Black ELA Scores, Middle 231.57 232.63 
  (12.52) (12.69) 
Mean Year of Order Dismissal - 2004 
   (4.30) 
Percent White 47.9 48.3 
  (25.74) (27.30) 
Percent Black 40.9 39.3 
  (27.7) (27.8) 
     
Number of School Districts 322 330 
Number of Observations 25,590 26,722 




 Figures 2-1 through 2-12 present graphical analyses of test scores over time, with 
separate trend lines for dismissed and non-dismissed districts. Year 0 is the year of 
dismissal for a particular district (or of the nearest dismissed district for districts still 
under orders). Years after year 0 are post-dismissal years. Negative years are years prior to 
dismissal.   
 
Figure 2-1: Average Math Test Scores of White Students, Grades 3-5. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among White elementary school students versus years released at 
observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation 
orders). Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district 
schools are located in. 
Figure 2-2: Average Math Test Scores of Black Students, Grades 3-5. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among Black elementary school students versus years released at 
observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation 
orders).  Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district 
schools are located in. 
 
 Figures 2-1 and 2-2 plot average NAEP-standardized mathematics test scores for 
White and Black elementary school students over time. Looking at Figure 2-1, the test 
scores of White students were fairly similar across dismissal status in the years pre-
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dismissal, hovering around 240. Scores gradually increase for both dismissed and non-
dismissed counties until about 10 years post-dismissal, at which point scores in dismissed 
districts begin a comparatively steep increase at the same time scores in non-dismissed 
districts plateau. At year 0, soon to be dismissed districts scored about 2.4 points higher 
than did non-dismissed districts. By year 15, average test scores between dismissed and 
non-dismissed districts have diverged enough that White students in dismissed districts 
scored about 7.3 points (an effect size of 54% of the standard deviation of White 
mathematics scores 15 years post-dismissal) higher than their counterparts in non-
dismissed districts. 
 Elementary school mathematics test scores among Black students begin about 20 
points lower than do those for White students, regardless of dismissal status. Scores are 
gradually increasing and approximately the same for Black students in both dismissed and 
non-dismissed districts until about 10 years post-dismissal. At this point, scores in 
dismissed districts begin steadily increasing (at a lower rate than that of White students in 
the same period), while scores in non-dismissed districts fall slightly, then rise.  At year 0, 
the difference between the average scores of Black students in dismissed and non-
dismissed districts was 0.7 points. By year 15, the difference was 1.9 points, an effect size 
of about 16% of the standard deviation of Black elementary mathematics scores at year 15. 
Figure 2-3 shows average White/Black differences in elementary school 




Figure 2-3: Average White/Black Difference in Math Test Scores, Grades 3-5. Shown are 
differences (mean White minus mean Black) in average NAEP-standardized test scores between 
White and Black elementary school students versus years released at observation (or at observation 
of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 
separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are located in. 
 
 At year 0, the average gap between White and Black elementary school math scores 
was about 1 point higher in soon to be dismissed districts than in non-dismissed districts; 
the average difference in non-dismissed districts was about 16.7 points, while the average 
difference in dismissed districts was 17.9 points. Both district types had similarly sized 
racial score gaps until about 11 years post-dismissal, at which point differences in non-
dismissed districts began to decrease, while differences in dismissed districts slightly 
increased. By year 15, the White/Black difference in scores was about 4.1 points larger 
(effect size = 54%) in districts that had desegregation orders terminated than in their non-
dismissed neighbors.  
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 Figures 2-4 and 2-5 show average mathematics test scores for White and Black 
middle school students over time: 
  
Figure 2-4: Average Math Test Scores of White Students, Grades 6-8. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among White middle school students versus years released at observation 
(or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). 
Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are 
located in. 
Figure 2-5: Average Math Test Scores of Black Students, Grades 6-8. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among Black middle school students versus years released at observation 
(or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). 
Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are 
located in. 
 
 Figure 2-4 exhibits a pattern similar to that shown in Figure 2-1. During the year of 
dismissal, White middle school students in soon-to-be dismissed districts scored about 4 
points higher than did their counterparts in districts still under desegregation orders. 
Scores in both district types decreased around the time of order dismissal and then were 
fairly flat and constant until about 9 years post-dismissal. At this point, scores diverged; 
scores in dismissed districts began increasing, while scores in non-dismissed districts 
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vacillated. By year 15, scores in dismissed districts were a little over 9 points higher than in 
non-dismissed districts (an effect size of 56%). 
Again, average middle school math scores were lower among Black students than 
among White students throughout the course of observation (Figure 2-5). Scores in both 
types of districts began fairly close to each other, with Black students in soon-to-be 
dismissed districts scoring 1.4 points higher on average than similar students in non-
dismissed districts at year 0. Scores in both groups closely resembled each other until 
converging at about 9 years post-dismissal. Beginning then, scores in dismissed districts 
gradually increase, while scores in non-dismissed districts stay fairly flat. At year 15, Black 
students in dismissed districts scored about 5 points higher (effect size = 38%) on middle 





Figure 2-6: Average White/Black Difference in Math Test Scores, Grades 6-8. Shown are 
differences (mean White minus mean Black) in average NAEP-standardized test scores between 
White and Black middle school students versus years released at observation (or at observation of 
closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 
separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are located in. 
 
Figure 2-6 shows average White/Black differences in middle school mathematics 
scores over time. This figure displays findings similar to those in Figure 2-3. Near the 
beginning of the series, at year 0, the average gap between the scores of White and Black 
students is 20.4 points in soon-to-be-dismissed districts and 18.5 points in non-dismissed 
districts (a difference of 1.9 points). Gaps are fairly similar across district type until about 
11 years post-dismissal. At this point, the gap between test scores of White and Black 
students continues slowly increasing in dismissed districts, while shrinking in non-
dismissed districts. By year 15, average White/Black differences in middle school math test 
scores were about 4.3 points higher than in non-dismissed districts (effect size = 43%).  
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Turning now to ELA scores, Figures 2-7 and 2-8 show average ELA scores among 
White and Black elementary school students:   
 
Figure 2-7: Average ELA Test Scores of White Students, Grades 3-5. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among White elementary school students versus years released at 
observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation 
orders). Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district 
schools are located in. 
Figure 2-8: Average ELA Test Scores of Black Students, Grades 3-5. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among Black elementary school students versus years released at 
observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation 
orders). Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district 
schools are located in. 
 
 Figure 2-7, which plots average elementary school ELA scores for White students, 
begins with fairly similar scores between non-dismissed and soon-to-be dismissed 
districts; at year 0, dismissing districts score about 1.5 points higher than districts that do 
not dismiss. Soon after, both groups average similar scores and trend upwards. Around 
year 10, trends between district types begin to diverge, as non-dismissed districts begin a 
flat trajectory while dismissed districts continue averaging higher scores. At year 15, White 
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elementary students in dismissed districts score about 7 points higher (effect size = 46%) 
on average on ELA tests than do similar students in nearby non-dismissed districts. 
 Figure 2-8 shows average elementary school ELA scores for Black students. Average 
Black scores are about 25 points lower than the average White scores displayed in Figure 7, 
on average. Scores begin remarkably similarly between groups; at year 0, the difference 
between average scores is only 70% of a point. Scores of dismissed and non-dismissed 
districts stay close to each other and flat through the course of observation, though they 
slightly diverge around year 9. Scores in both types of districts begin to gently increase, 
though the scores of students in dismissed districts increased more. By year 15, Black 
students in dismissed districts scored about 2.5 points higher (effect size = 18%) on 






Figure 2-9: Average White/Black Difference in ELA Test Scores, Grades 3-5. Shown are 
differences (mean White minus mean Black) in average NAEP-standardized test scores between 
White and Black elementary school students versus years released at observation (or at observation 
of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 
separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are located in. 
 
Figure 2-9 shows average White/Black differences in elementary school ELA scores 
over time. At year 0, the average gap between White and Black ELA scores in elementary 
school was about 0.5 points higher in non-dismissed districts than in dismissed districts. 
The average White/Black difference in non-dismissed districts was 21.2 points, while the 
average difference in dismissed districts was 20.7 points. From year -1 until the end of 
observation, the gap between White and Black elementary school ELA scores consistently 
and mildly rose in dismissed districts, while the gap in non-dismissed districts was mostly 
flat, then rose slightly around year 8, then began a decline at year 11. At year 15, the 




Finally, figures 2-10 and 2-11 show average ELA middle school test scores among 
White, then Black students: 
 
Figure 2-10: Average ELA Test Scores of White Students, Grades 6-8. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among White middle school students versus years released at observation 
(or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). 
Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are 
located in. 
Figure 2-11: Average ELA Test Scores of Black Students, Grades 6-8. Shown are average NAEP-
standardized test scores among Black middle school students versus years released at observation 
(or at observation of closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). 
Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the district schools are 
located in. 
 
 Figure 2-10 shows middle school ELA scores for White students. At year 0, students 
in soon-to-be dismissed districts score about 2 points higher on average than do students 
in districts that do not dismiss their desegregation orders. Scores between the two groups 
stay fairly close and flat until about 9 years post-dismissal, at which point dismissed scores 
begin trending slightly more upwards. Non-dismissed scores stay fairly flat, with a slight 
dip and uptick around years 12 and 13, then begin trending down. At year 15, White 
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students in dismissed districts score on average about 5.5 points higher (effect size = 37%) 
than White students in districts still under orders.  
 Figure 2-11 shows middle school ELA scores for Black students. Once again, middle 
school ELA scores for Black students are about 22 points lower than those for White 
students. At year 0, scores between dismissed and non-dismissed districts are negligible – 
about a tenth of a point. Scores between groups stay flat and very close to each other until 
about year 9, when scores in dismissed districts begin to increase. Scores in non-dismissed 
districts stay mostly flat (though they do very slightly trend upwards).  By year 15, 
dismissed scores of Black students are about 4.2 points higher (effect size = 32%), on 
average, that non-dismissed middle school ELA scores of Black students 
  
Figure 2-12: Average White/Black Difference in ELA Test Scores, Grades 6-8. Shown are 
differences (mean White minus mean Black) in average NAEP-standardized test scores between 
White and Black middle school students versus years released at observation (or at observation of 
closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 




 Figure 2-12, plots average White/Black differences in middle school ELA scores over 
time. At year 0, the gap between White and Black students is similar in dismissed and non-
dismissed districts: the average gap in dismissed districts is 21.5, while the average gap in 
non-dismissed districts is 20.5. Score gaps stay close to each other until about 13 years 
post-dismissal, at which point the score gap begins to narrow in non-dismissed districts. At 
year 15, dismissed districts have a White/Black middle school ELA score gap that is about 3 
points larger (effect size = 27%) than that of non-dismissed districts. 
 Tables 2-2 through 2-5 show regression-adjusted estimates of differences in 
average subject and school type test scores between dismissed and non-dismissed districts 






Table 2-2: Regression Estimates of Difference in Average Elementary School Math Scores Between Dismissed and Non-Dismissed Districts by Relative Year 
of Dismissal 
 
----- Year of Dismissal or Year of Dismissal of Nearest Neighbor ----- 
  -1   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
                                        
White 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.9 -0.7 -2.6** -0.8 -0.3 1.7 2.3 4.8*** 5.9*** 4.3*** 7.9*** 
  (2.45) (1.71) (1.37) (1.22) (1.15) (1.21) (1.12) (1.07) (1.09) (1.11) (1.18) (1.33) (1.37) (1.39) (1.48) (1.45) (1.53) (1.52) (1.94) 
obs 165 273 384 589 699 811 850 912 930 861 719 643 607 551 499 429 368 282 224 
      
 
                  
Black 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.3 -0.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.4 -0.4 1.1 0.4 1.7 1.7 0.6 2.4 
  (1.75) (1.49) (1.19) (0.99) (0.96) (0.92) (0.89) (0.84) (0.87) (0.87) (0.94) (0.95) (1.04) (1.05) (1.17) (1.21) (1.33) (1.40) (1.69) 
obs 165 278 386 587 717 820 868 945 965 907 744 660 579 552 458 366 314 247 181 
      
 
                  
Gap -2.0 0.6 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -1.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 1.7 2.5** 4.2*** 4.5*** 6.2*** 
  (1.48) (1.19) (1.05) (1.01) (0.91) (0.94) (0.88) (0.82) (0.81) (0.84) (0.92) (1.06) (1.08) (1.04) (1.15) (1.15) (1.14) (1.40) (1.68) 
obs 147 253 350 521 618 709 729 772 784 737 593 543 493 462 419 350 299 231 175 
 




----- Year of Dismissal or Year of Dismissal of Nearest Neighbor ----- 
  -1   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
                                        
White 1.8 1.3 1.6 0.9 -0.0 0.5 0.7 1.0 -0.9 0.3 -1.5 0.1 -0.1 2.7 2.5 6.2*** 6.5*** 8.4*** 9.0*** 
  (2.87) (2.19) (1.88) (1.58) (1.42) (1.41) (1.32) (1.30) (1.38) (1.43) (1.53) (1.65) (1.71) (1.78) (1.76) (1.79) (1.99) (2.32) (2.24) 
obs 163 259 357 556 643 747 788 853 860 814 682 605 561 487 421 374 321 277 202 
      
 
                  
Black 0.4 -0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.6* 0.2 -0.3 -1.5 -0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 3.4** 4.3*** 3.1* 6.1*** 
  (1.85) (1.57) (1.26) (1.19) (0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (0.96) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (1.03) (1.16) (1.19) (1.30) (1.37) (1.50) (1.73) (1.87) 
obs 162 267 363 569 684 772 833 908 911 866 720 634 544 488 397 327 277 238 164 
      
 
                  
Gap 0.8 1.2 -1.0 -0.7 -2.0* -0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -1.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 0.2 1.3 1.5 4.3*** 3.6** 6.3*** 5.1*** 
  (1.77) (1.46) (1.29) (1.23) (1.16) (1.06) (1.02) (0.96) (1.02) (1.02) (1.20) (1.32) (1.32) (1.38) (1.50) (1.40) (1.58) (1.77) (1.77) 
obs 147 239 323 499 572 644 688 740 736 699 570 510 452 416 354 304 262 224 159 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions use average scores or average score gaps as outcomes. Regression models control for percent White and Black in grades 
schools, grade, year, and include standard errors clustered at school district. Comparison groups are school districts still under desegregation orders (y=0) and school districts that had 











Table 2-4: Regression Estimates of Difference in Average Elementary School ELA Scores Between Dismissed and Non-Dismissed Districts by Relative Year 
of Dismissal 
 
----- Year of Dismissal or Year of Dismissal of Nearest Neighbor ----- 
  -1   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
      
 
                  
White -1.6 0.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.6 -0.5 1.2 0.3 1.8 2.5 5.3*** 5.8*** 5.7*** 9.0*** 
  (2.56) (2.07) (1.62) (1.48) (1.39) (1.35) (1.34) (1.37) (1.28) (1.31) (1.49) (1.67) (1.69) (1.84) (1.83) (1.89) (2.02) (1.92) (2.17) 
obs 165 283 387 604 727 829 878 921 946 884 719 643 607 551 523 435 376 282 227 
      
 
                  
Black 1.4 0.4 1.3 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.2 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.5 1.8 0.2 2.4* 2.0 0.4 5.9*** 
  (1.88) (1.56) (1.47) (1.08) (0.96) (0.93) (0.95) (0.92) (0.91) (0.94) (1.03) (1.11) (1.16) (1.14) (1.35) (1.38) (1.57) (1.65) (1.74) 
obs 168 288 391 603 744 842 889 952 984 935 746 659 580 554 479 371 322 247 185 
      
 
                  
Gap -3.4* -1.1 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.8 -0.0 -1.1 0.5 -0.3 0.2 2.0 2.6* 3.9*** 6.4*** 4.2** 
  (2.01) (1.68) (1.39) (1.39) (1.25) (1.15) (1.11) (1.16) (1.03) (1.11) (1.28) (1.48) (1.41) (1.40) (1.43) (1.54) (1.40) (1.75) (1.99) 
obs 147 264 353 536 645 727 752 779 802 759 596 544 494 462 445 355 308 231 178 
 
Table 2-5: Regression Estimates of Difference in Average Middle School ELA Scores Between Dismissed and Non-Dismissed Districts by Relative Year of 
Dismissal 
 
----- Year of Dismissal or Year of Dismissal of Nearest Neighbor ----- 
  -1   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
      
 
                  
White 1.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 0.9 1.2 -0.2 0.2 -1.0 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.0 3.0* 5.0** 7.6*** 6.7*** 
  (2.41) (1.83) (1.49) (1.33) (1.29) (1.30) (1.25) (1.21) (1.20) (1.32) (1.40) (1.56) (1.64) (1.69) (1.63) (1.65) (1.95) (1.95) (2.17) 
obs 165 278 382 601 708 810 861 903 927 875 702 636 603 549 507 424 370 280 224 
      
 
                  
Black 0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 -0.4 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 0.2 1.4 1.0 2.1* 3.4** 3.6** 6.0*** 
  (1.74) (1.22) (1.00) (0.93) (0.82) (0.80) (0.77) (0.82) (0.80) (0.85) (0.91) (1.03) (1.05) (1.09) (1.09) (1.15) (1.34) (1.48) (1.57) 
obs 167 286 392 611 749 836 895 955 984 934 744 663 589 539 465 361 313 238 185 
      
 
                  
Gap -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4 1.2 -0.0 -0.2 2.0 3.1* 4.5** 2.7 
  (2.09) (1.57) (1.33) (1.21) (1.19) (1.13) (1.09) (1.06) (1.01) (1.10) (1.24) (1.38) (1.46) (1.44) (1.59) (1.49) (1.61) (1.85) (1.87) 
obs 149 258 347 540 635 703 745 779 796 758 591 538 495 465 423 338 298 224 179 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions use average scores or average score gaps as outcomes. Regression models control for percent White and Black in grades 
schools, grade, year, and include standard errors clustered at school district. Comparison groups are school districts still under desegregation orders (y=0) and school districts that had 
their desegregation orders dismissed (y=1).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 2-2 presents regression adjusted estimates of differences in elementary 
school math scores and is a companion to Figures 2-1 through 2-3. After adjusting for grade 
percentage Black and White, year, grade of students, and clustering standard errors at the 
school district, estimates of difference look fairly similar to the unweighted differences 
displayed in the Figures. Adjusted estimates diverge slightly from raw figures on the ends 
of the observation window. Elementary school math scores of White students are fairly 
close until about 12 years post-dismissal, at which point differences between comparison 
groups begins to widen. At year 14, estimates of difference become strongly statistically 
significant, and remain so until the end of observation. From year 14 to 17, White students 
in dismissed districts do somewhere between 4 to 8 points better (adjusted effect size 
between 35 and 57%) on elementary school math tests than do White students in non-
dismissed districts. 
 No statistically significant differences in the elementary school math scores between 
Black students in dismissed and non-dismissed districts was detected, and scores between 
the comparison groups remained fairly similar throughout all years. 
 Regression testing confirms the earlier observation that the gap between White and 
Black elementary school math scores widened in later years, as estimates for years 14 
through 17 are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Dismissed districts exhibit a 
racial score gap between about 2 and 6 (adjusted effect size between 31 and 77%) points 
during this period. 
 Table 2-3 presents regression adjusted estimates of differences in middle school 
math scores and corresponds to Figures 2-4 through 2-6. Similar to Table 2-2, statistical 
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significance appears at year 14 and continues through the end of observation for both 
White middle school math scores, and for the White/Black gap in those scores. In the 
middle school estimates, however, Black scores also exhibit significant differences from 
year 14 onward. White students score between 6 and 9 points better (effect size between 
38 and 55%) in dismissed districts, Black students score between 3 and 6 points better 
(effect size = 24-46%), and the White/Black gap is between 4 and 6 points greater in 
dismissed districts in that same time frame (effect size = 35-61 %). 
 Table 2-4, corresponding to Figures 2-7 through 2-9, shows adjusted estimates of 
elementary school ELA scores. Once again, differences in scores do not exhibit statistical 
significance until year 14, at which point White students in dismissed districts do better by 
a magnitude of somewhere between 5 and 9 points (effect size = 35-59%). Black students 
also do better, though only the 14-year figure is statistically significant, and marginally so. 
The excess White/Black gap shown by dismissed districts in elementary school ELA scores 
ranges from 2.6 to 6.4 points from year 14 onward (effect size = 26-64%). 
 Table 2-5, companion to Figures 2-10 through 2-12, shows regression adjusted 
estimates of middle school ELA score differences. This time, both White and Black score 
differences begin exhibiting statistically significant divergence from each other at year 14, 
all in favor of dismissed districts. White students in dismissed districts perform between 3 
and 8 points better on ELA tests in middle school than do White students in non-dismissed 
districts (effect size = 20-52%), while Black students in dismissed districts do between 2 
and 6 points better (effect size = 16.3-47%). The excess gap is only statistically significant 
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in years 15 and 16, ranging between 3 and 4.5 extra gap points for dismissed districts 
(effect sizes = 31 and 45%).  
 
Discussion: 
 My findings indicate that there are indeed differences in academic achievement 
between students in school districts that remained under desegregation orders and ones 
that had their orders terminated. White students in districts that have desegregation 
orders dismissed do better about 14 years after orders are terminated, with average test 
scores about 6 points higher than nearby White students in districts still under 
desegregation orders (this is a difference equal to around 40% of a standard deviation of 
average scores). Black students also do better, though few significant gains were found in 
elementary school grades. In middle school, Black students in dismissed districts did about 
4 points better than their non-dismissed neighbors (a gain of about a third of a standard 
deviation). However, though both White and Black students saw increases in average test 
scores over time, these gains were unequal. 
 Unequal gains translated to widening gaps between Black and White students in 
districts released from desegregation orders. Across subjects and school types, the gap 
between White and Black scores increased over time in dismissed districts. In districts still 
under desegregation orders, the gap actually narrowed in every subject and school type.  
 Of note, it does appear that it takes some time for the effects of changes in 
desegregation enforcement to take hold in schools, and to affect student outcomes. I was 
unable to detect any statistically significant differences between scores in dismissed and 
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non-dismissed districts until 14 years post-order termination. This is a longer timeframe 
post-dismissal than expected but may make sense. If Reardon’s (2012) assertion that 
resegregation of school districts occurs over at least 10 years after desegregation orders 
are dismissed, then it makes sense that school level outcomes might not be affected until 
the students within schools have been racially re-sorted. Divergences in average test scores 
appear in earnest in most of my analyses at around years 9-11, though they are not large 
enough to register as statistically significant until a few years later.  
This study is not without limitations. Even though I am detecting divergences in student 
scores, my data does not currently allow me to investigate how resegregation may have 
translated into differences in test scores. One supplemental analysis attempted to see if 
time after desegregation order dismissal was correlated with changes in student teacher 
ratios, and found no systematic differences between dismissed and non-dismissed districts. 
Ideally, I would look at per pupil spending over time and by race of student across 
dismissal status, but currently available data only has information on spending per pupil 
for all races.  
In sum, I have shown that there are long term effects of release from desegregation 
orders on educational inequality. Once dismissed, the gap between test scores of White and 
Black students widens. It appears that students in school districts that had their 
desegregation orders terminated are experiencing different academic trajectories than do 
students still studying under the auspices of desegregation orders. School districts continue 
to seek release from these orders, and do so without full knowledge of the effects of no 




School Desegregation Retrenchment and Black/White Differences in Home Values 
Introduction: 
 Beginning in the early 1990s, a series of rulings passed through the Supreme Court 
drastically changing the landscape of school desegregation enforcement. In 1991, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell that once school 
districts were declared unitary (that is, not separated into racially disparate sub-districts), 
they could be permanently released from court oversight. Freeman v. Pitts (1992), another 
Supreme Court case, made it easier for districts to qualify as being unitary. Missouri v. 
Jenkins (1995) limited the power of federal courts to enforce integration orders and 
emphasized that release to local control of school districts should be the end goal of all 
desegregation plans.  
 As a result of these three rulings, hundreds of schools districts, more than half of all 
districts ever under court orders, were eventually released from court oversight requiring 
them to remain desegregated. Concurrently, racial school segregation in these districts 
began to gradually increase (Lutz, 2011; Reardon, 2012). This evidence of resegregation, 
however, is essentially that all we know about the effects of slackening desegregation 
enforcement. Little work has examined the effects of this reversal of educational policy on 
the environments of minority children and families affected by them.  
A previous chapter of this dissertation examined whether there were systematic 
differences between school districts that had their desegregation orders terminated and 
districts that did not, and found little evidence of systematic predictors of order 
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termination. In this paper, I present an analysis of how property taxes – an indicator of 
housing values -- responded to changes in desegregation enforcement. Home values are 
examined for two main reasons: (1) because they are an important indicator of the amount 
of wealth families and individuals have access to (as many households hold the majority of 
their wealth in home equity), and (2) because property taxes are a major determinant of 
school funding and quality, as most areas use collected property taxes to fund public 
schools. Home values and their proxy, property taxes, can tell us a great deal about the 
economic wellbeing of households and neighborhoods, and how racial disparities in wealth 
change over time.  
I conduct analyses by types of neighborhood to investigate whether effects of 
desegregation policy changes vary by the racial composition of neighborhoods. I intend for 
the results of this study to describe how termination of school desegregation orders shifted 
the environments of those affected in ways that extended past school walls. 
Effects of resegregation 
 Reardon and coauthors (2012) found a gradual increase in the school segregation of 
districts following their release from court order, beginning in earnest about 6 years after 
order lift and persisting for at least 10 years post-release (note: this is consistent with 
predictions made by experts on desegregation enforcement during interviews conducted in 
Paper 1). Resegregation occurred more drastically in the south, among elementary grades, 
and in districts where segregation levels before release from oversight were low. Lutz 
(2011) also found evidence of a moderate increase in school racial segregation following 
release from court order.  
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 Few non-educational outcomes of resegregation have been examined, but 
researchers have found evidence of its effects on criminal behavior. Using the end of court-
ordered busing as a desegregation strategy in the Charlotte-Mecklenberg school system 
(CMS) as a natural experiment, Billings et al. (2012) found that minority males assigned to 
schools with higher proportions of minority students experienced large increases in the 
probabilities of arrest and incarceration, mostly for violent and property arrests. No effects 
were found for minority females or non-minorities.  
 Evidence on the effects of release from court oversight on dropout is mixed. Lutz 
(2011) found increased Black dropout rates outside of the south, but no change in the 
attendance patterns of southern Black students. Further, southern White students were 
more likely to re-enter districts no longer under court order from schools outside of the 
public school system, while Black students were more likely to leave the public school 
system in order to enter private schools. Billings et al. (2012) found no evidence of changes 
in high school graduation rates for minorities affected by the elimination of busing in 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg County, though they did find evidence of higher dropout rates 
among poor non-minorities (though they urge that this result be interpreted with caution, 
as they could not account for the effects of selective migration out of public schools in the 
district following release from court order). All students, regardless of race, were more 
likely to score lower on high school exams once placed in schools with higher proportions 
of minorities in CMS. Notably, a study of the end of court ordered desegregation plans in 
Nashville found no effects on student achievement consequent to attending schools with 
higher proportions of Black students; instead, it found that exposure to increased 
proportions of low-income students reduced test scores (Gamoran, 2016). 
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Effects of changing neighborhood composition on property values and other 
demographics 
 Little research exists examining the effects of changing neighborhood composition 
on property values and other demographics, but there have been a few suggestive studies. 
Liebowitz and Page (2014) used the granting of unitary status in CMS to examine the 
effects of the ending of desegregation enforcement on the residential decisions of 
households affected. They found that, conditional on moving, White families with children 
were more likely to move to another neighborhood with a greater proportion of White 
residents than they were before CMS’s release from court order; no such pattern was found 
among non-White families. Using panel data from Connecticut, Clapp et al. (2008) found 
that a 1 percent increase in the share of Black or Hispanic students in a district decreased 
average property values by about a third of a percent. Bogart and Cromwell (2000) found 
that after school redistricting was introduced in Shaker Heights, Ohio in the late 1980s 
property values fell by about 10%. Taken together, these findings suggest that changes in 
the racial composition of schools within districts are likely to have substantial effects on 
average property values in that area.  They also suggest that resegregation of school 
districts may increase White home values while simultaneously decreasing Black home 
values, especially in areas that have high concentrations of either race. 
Hypothesized mechanisms 
Prior work has provided clues about what the consequences of release from 
desegregation court orders may look like. Evidence suggests that consequences will likely 
vary depending both on the race of who experiences desegregation termination and on the 
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composition of the neighborhood that person resides in. This all hinges on one fact: White 
and Black families appear to value integrated schools differently. While I found no evidence 
in the literature of Black aversion to integrated schools, several studies suggest that White 
families fled school districts after the introduction of desegregation orders. Welch & Light 
(1987) and Reber (2005) found significant White enrollment losses after the introduction 
of desegregation orders, while Clotfelter (2004), Reardon and Yun (2003) found evidence 
of increasing White enrollment in private schools during the era of desegregation. 
Similarly, Saporito (2003, 2007) found that White families living in predominantly Black 
school attendance zones were less likely to enroll their children in the schools zoned for 
them than White families living in White neighborhoods. All of this suggests that White 
families, on average, value less integrated schools more than they do schools where their 
children would be likely to be exposed to large numbers of Black children. 
This has direct implications for this paper. If White families value Whiter schools, 
then they are likely to pay more for homes in neighborhoods that feed into schools with 
higher concentrations of White students. Since termination of desegregation orders 
resulted in the resegregation of many school districts, creating racially distinct schools, and 
since average White incomes and wealth holdings are generally much higher than those of 
Black households, this would mean that the value of homes in White neighborhoods would 
increase via increased demand and available means to buy those houses. Existing patterns 
of racial residential segregation would ensure that most White homes would feed into 
newly segregated White schools. Black neighborhoods, on the other hand, would feed into 
segregated Black schools, newly drained of the financial and social resources White 
students brought with them. This would likely cause a decrease in Black home values.  
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I expect effects on property values to be most strongly apparent in neighborhoods 
that are residentially racially segregated, as these are the areas whose residents would be 
most affected by changes in school attendance patterns as a result of ended desegregation 
enforcement. For instance, a Black student living in an integrated neighborhood would 
likely not be affected by order termination, as once the order ends, she would still be 
assigned to a nearby school mirroring her neighborhood demographics. A Black student 
living in a segregated Black neighborhood, however, would see his school assignment 
changed – he would go from being assigned to an integrated school to being assigned to a 
nearby school mirroring his neighborhood demographics with a high percentage of Black 
students. Future movers to that county would be faced with a choice: move to a 
neighborhood with better-resources schools (due to a higher percentage of White 
students) or move to a neighborhood with fewer resources (due to a lower percentage of 
White students). The choice made would affect the value of homes in both White and Black 
areas of a county by driving up demand in White neighborhoods and driving down demand 
in Black neighborhoods. I also expect to see effects on White and Black home values on 
average, regardless of neighborhood racial composition, owing to the already residentially 
segregated nature of most neighborhoods. 
Of note, most of the existing studies of the effects of resegregation (Lutz 2011; 
Reardon et al, 2012) report lagged effects on outcomes following the termination of 
desegregation orders, taking between 2 and 10 years to become apparent. For this reason, I 
expect that the effects of termination of desegregation orders will not be seen immediately, 
and will likely become visible after at least 5 years.  
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In this chapter, I test 2 hypotheses: 
(1) On average, White home values will increase after order termination. Increases 
will be largest in segregated White neighborhoods. 
(2) On average, Black home values will decrease after order termination. Decreases 
will be largest in segregated Black neighborhoods. 
Data, Measures, and Methods: 
Datasets 
The primary source of data for this paper is the American Community Survey (ACS), 
which contains information on this chapter’s primary outcome: annual property taxes 
collected. The ACS is a large (approximately 2 million households per year) cross-sectional 
annual survey of households and living quarters conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data 
are collected on geographic location (state and county), annual property taxes, and racial 
identities of household members. Data from survey years 2005 – 2015, the years for which 
county identifiers were publicly available, were appended in order to create a pooled 
analytical sample. Counties with more than one school district were excluded in order to 
ensure that counties included in the analysis sample were as similar as possible, and to 
ensure that in cases when data was only available at the county level, it made sense to 
attach them to school districts; this way, county and district characteristics could be used 
interchangeably. One-district counties accounted for the vast majority (~75%) of counties 
ever subject to desegregation orders. Counties that did not contain any school districts ever 
under a court-mandated desegregation order were also excluded in order to create a 
database made up only of counties that had been subject to desegregation orders.  
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Desegregation order initiation dates are from Brown University’s American 
Communities Project (ACP) desegregation court cases and school demographic data 
segregation case data files.  These data are a collection of every court case and Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) action regarding desegregation listed separately 
by school district (n = 2,124). Desegregation order end dates for all orders initiated 
between 1954-2014, district identifiers, and indicators of whether or not districts were 
ever subject to a federal desegregation order are from ProPublica’s School Desegregation 
Orders data archive, the most comprehensive publicly available dataset of court-ordered 
desegregation orders in the U.S. available at the time of writing this. It consists of 
information gathered from the U.S. Department of Education, Department of Justice, 
Stanford University, and ProPublica research. 
Yearly county percent White and Black, used as control variables in subsequent 
analyses, are from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) version of the Census 
U.S. Intercensal County Population estimates (June figures). County latitudes and 
longitudes are from Census 2010 Gazetteer files. Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA)-level 
percent Black and White are ACS 1-year estimates and were used to construct measures of 
approximate neighborhood racial composition. In all cases, county-level characteristics 
were used for analysis unless they were only available at the school district level. 
After dropping observations in counties that did not fit the inclusion criteria 
(counties housing only one district, and counties having experienced at least one 
desegregation order in the past), the final analytic sample was composed of 94 counties, 
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each observed during multiple years between 2005 and 2015 (863 county-year 
observations), and 5,424,828 individual observations. 
Measures 
Descriptions follow of key measures: 
Property taxes: Property taxes are assessed using this formula: effective property 
taxes (the amount that homeowners are responsible for paying) = state assessment ratio * 
area mill levy * the assessed value of a property (source: Investopedia). Assessment ratios, 
which vary by state and year, are percentages of the market value of properties. The mill 
levy, or the local property tax rate, is determined by taking the total monetary value an 
area (usually county) needs to continue operations, and dividing it by the total assessed 
value of property in that area. Property values are assessed by local government officials 
called assessors, who are responsible for maintaining a database of all of the values of all of 
the properties within their jurisdiction, updated yearly. Assessors use local real estate data, 
in combination with occasional physical visits to properties in order to arrive at the fair 
market value of properties. The main piece of information used by assessors to determine 
the market value of houses is how similar nearby properties have sold. Average state 
effective property tax rates are usually under 3% of the assessed fair market value of a 
home, ranging between .43% in Alabama (the state with the lowest effective property taxes 
in my sample) and 2.38% of fair market value in New Jersey in 2015 (Walczak, 2015).  
I use property taxes as a proxy for home values because they are a frequently 
updated and publicly available marker of home values, that vary as the neighborhoods 
containing homes change. Since much of the variation in property taxes collected depends 
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on how much nearby homes have sold for, and since homes near each other are taxed at the 
same rate, this is a useful measure of changing neighborhood property values over time. It 
bears noting that the fair market values of homes, as well as billed property tax amounts, 
are likely to change slowly in response to a change in neighborhood environments, as it 
may take a few years for average home values to exhibit enough of a change for assessors 
to adjust home valuations.   
The variable used to create my measure of property taxes collected reports 
household total real estate tax costs in US dollars, including state, local, and other taxes for 
the year prior to ACS data collection. This serves as my proxy for home values. These 
amounts were adjusted for inflation and converted to real 2005 dollars. County-level mean 
property taxes were calculated for each county in each year using individual property tax 
responses. Separate means were calculated for Black and White households in counties. 
PUMA-level mean property taxes were also created by race, using similar methods, in order 
to have a measure of neighborhood-level home values.  
Race: Households were assigned a race based on the reported race of the 
respondent during their ACS interview. Black households are households in which the 
respondent was Black, regardless of Hispanic origin, and White households are those in 
which the respondent was White, again regardless of Hispanic origin. These racial 
classifications were chosen in order to use the most inclusive racial categories possible. 
Percent White and Black in county: County-level percent White and Black were 
calculated using Census data for every year of observation. This is included as a control in 
regression models as it is a likely covariate of county-level race-specific property values. 
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Neighborhood racial composition: PUMAs were classified as high-Black if their 
populations were > 40% Black, well above the national average percent Black (13.3%). 
PUMAs were classified as high-White if their populations were > 80% White, above the 
national average percent White (77%). Neighborhood racial composition was calculated at 
the PUMA level instead of by county in order to test whether or not racially concentrated 
neighborhoods exhibited steeper rates of change in property values than average.  
Methods 
Proportion of nearby districts terminated: The proportion of nearby counties that 
experienced order dismissals was calculated by using latitude and longitude data in 
combination with Stata’s geonear package to find each school district’s 5 closest district 
neighbors ever under order (distances ranged from 3- 506 miles, with the median distance 
to a neighbor of 24 miles; 75% of neighbors were within 35 miles of each other). The 
number of these districts that were dismissed was divided by 5, yielding the proportion of 
nearby districts that were dismissed. This is included as a control variable in regression 
models based on my finding in Chapter 1 that this is a significant predictor of desegregation 
order termination. 
Year at observation: Each county was assigned a year of dismissal based on the 
dates provided in the SDOD. Using that dismissal year, which is that county's year 0, each 
county was assigned a year at observation for every year that it was observed in the ACS. 
For instance, if a county's desegregation order was dismissed in 2006, then its 2006 
observation would be coded as year 0, its 2007 observation would be coded as year 1, its 
 62 
 
2009 observation would be coded as year 3, its 2005 observation would be coded as year -
1, and so on. 
Following this, each non-dismissed county in the dataset was matched to its most 
geographically proximal neighbor county that had its desegregation order terminated. This 
was done by using county centroid latitudes and longitudes in conjunction with the Stata 
package geonear. These control counties were then assigned a variable indicating the year 
of dismissal of their nearest neighbor.  Non-dismissed counties were matched to their 
nearest dismissed neighbors in order to create a geographically proximal comparison 
group to the group of dismissed counties, similar in local characteristics. 
 For every county in the dataset, mean property taxes were calculated for each year 
before (up to 8), during (1, year 0), and after release (up to 20) from desegregation orders. 
This was done separately for Black and White households. For graphical analysis, counties 
were centered at the year that their orders were dismissed. For instance, if a county’s 
desegregation order was dismissed in 2002, then that county’s observation for year 0 
would be their 2002 mean (for dismissed districts; for non-dismissed districts, counties 
were centered at the year of order termination of their nearest neighbor). Black and White 
property taxes were compared separately among dismissed and non-dismissed districts.  
 I begin with a visual analysis of trends in property values, comparing property taxes 
in lifted versus not-lifted districts over time. I do this first among all White households, 
then among all Black households, then among Black households in high percentage Black 
PUMAs, then finally among White households in high percentage White PUMAs.  
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 I then test differences between lifted and non-lifted values in a regression 
framework. Beginning 7 years prior to termination, I analyze annual changes in average 
property values over 3 periods: -7 to -1 years (pre-termination), 0 to 6 years (early post-
termination), and 7 – 13 years (post-termination period). Analyzing variation in year-over-
year changes in Black and White property taxes differences out seasonal variations and 
provides a useful way of approaching time-series data. I define the year-over-year change 
in mean property tax Y as:  
(1)     ΔY = Yrt/Yr,t-1 – 1 
where r indicates race (White or Black), and t indicates year.  
I consider a simple OLS specification separately during each of the 3 time periods, 
regressing the average county change in White or Black property values on an indicator of 
whether or not districts were dismissed, and controlling for county percent Black, percent 
White, and the proportion of nearby districts dismissed.  I also include year fixed effects 
and include standard errors clustered at the county level using Stata 15’s VCE command. 
Results: 
Table 3-1 shows characteristics of counties that were under desegregation orders at 
observation and those that had their orders terminated before observation. It also shows 
characteristics of high percentage White and Black PUMAs, under orders and released from 
orders.  Mean property taxes collected were highest in areas still under orders, regardless 
of segregation status, and were lowest in high percentage Black PUMAs, regardless of order 
status. The proportions of nearby districts terminated were similar across areas and order 
statuses, and showed the most variation in high percentage Black PUMAs. Areas under 
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orders typically had a higher percentage of White residents than terminated areas, though 
there were slightly fewer White residents in high percentage Black PUMAs under orders 
than in terminated areas. Terminated areas were usually home to higher percentages of 
Black residents, though in high percentage Black PUMAs, there was about the same 
concentration of Black residents in under order areas as in terminated areas. 
 My analysis in Paper 1 showed no systematic correlates of lifting orders except for 
the proportion of nearby districts dismissed, which was generally higher among districts 
that had orders terminated. This is consistent with Table 3-1, in which characteristics were 
generally similar across dismissal status.  
Table 3-1: Characteristics of Counties Under Desegregation Orders and Counties With Orders Terminated 














Mean Property Taxes (in 2005 $$) $3,432 $2,481 $3,382 $2,540 $3,039 $2,293 
Proportion of Nearby Districts 
Terminated 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 
Percent White 76.1 71.4 82.9 79.4 57.6 58.1 
Percent Black 14.5 19.8 9.8 13.4 36.0 34.7 
Number of Counties 46 53 22 26 29 16 
       
 
 Figures 3-1 through 3-4 present mean property values over time, by race and by 
dismissal status. Year 0 is the year of order dismissal for a particular county (or order 
dismissal of nearest neighbor, for counties still under orders), and each year after is years 
since dismissal. Negative years are years before dismissal. Of note: in nearly all of the 
trendlines displayed, property taxes display a steep increase around 4 years before 
dismissal followed by a steep decrease right before year 0. This is likely due to the effects of 
the 2008 recession, in which housing values were overvalued and then swiftly depreciated. 
 65 
 
Many (about 9.4%) of the districts observed had their orders lifted in 2002 – the housing 





Figure 3-1: Mean White Annual Property Taxes Among Districts Ever Under Desegregation 
Orders. Shown are mean annual property taxes collected from White households (converted to 2005 
dollars) versus years released at observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in 
districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order 
dismissal status of the county households are located in. 
Figure 3-2: Mean Black Annual Property Taxes Among Districts Ever Under Desegregation 
Orders. Shown are mean annual property taxes collected from Black households (converted to 2005 
dollars) versus years released at observation (or at observation of closest neighbor for students in 
districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted separately by the desegregation order 
dismissal status of the county households are located in. 
Figure 3-3: Mean White Annual Property Taxes (High % White PUMAs) Among Districts Ever 
Under Desegregation Orders. Shown are mean annual property taxes collected from White 
households (converted to 2005 dollars) versus years released at observation (or at observation of 
closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 
separately by the desegregation order dismissal status of the county households are located in. 
Figure 3-4: Mean Black Annual Property Taxes (High % Black PUMAs) Among Districts Ever 
Under Desegregation Orders. Shown are mean annual property taxes collected from Black 
households (converted to 2005 dollars) versus years released at observation (or at observation of 
closest neighbor for students in districts still under desegregation orders). Trends are plotted 




 Figure 3-1 shows mean annual property taxes collected among White-owned homes 
over time. Dismissed counties begin relatively low in the pre-dismissal period, display a 
temporary but steep increase at about 4 years before dismissal, and then a decline right 
before dismissal. They remain steady until about 7 years after dismissal (with a slight 
uptick around year 4), then begin to slightly increase until the end of the time series. Non-
dismissed counties exhibit a similar pattern from pre-dismissal until about year 5, when 
they display a sharp decline, level off, and then continue to slowly decline.  
Figure 3-2 shows trends in Black annual property taxes. Dismissed counties begin 
fairly low before year 0, then gradually increase until about 2 years before dismissal of 
their closest neighbor, at which point they stay fairly level, while trending very slightly 
down. Non-dismissed counties exhibit a strikingly similar patterning to those in Figure 3-1, 
though the decline after year 0 is steeper on average.  
Figure 3-3 shows trends in White annual property taxes in high percentage White 
PUMAs. Data is only available beginning 4 years before dismissal for these PUMAs because 
the dataset did not contain any observations before this (similarly, in high percentage Black 
PUMAs, the dataset did not contain any observations before -4 years or after 13 years 
among non-dismissed homes). Dismissed values show a drop right before dismissal, 
followed by a fairly level period until about 6 years out, a drop, and then a fairly steady 
increase from year 7 until the end of the series. Homes in non-dismissed high percentage 
White PUMAs behave similarly those in Figure 3-1, declining until about year 4, when there 
is a slight uptick, followed by a steep decline at year 7. Afterwards, taxes stay mostly level, 
while trending slightly up.  
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Figure  3-4 shows trends in Black annual property taxes in high percentage Black 
PUMAs. Dismissed values trend down until about year 2, then gradually increase until year 
7, then begin a gradual decrease until the end of the series. Non-dismissed values trend 
down until about 8 years post-dismissal of nearest dismissed neighbor county, then level 
off until year 13, when data is no longer available. 
 Table 3-2 presents regression-adjusted estimates of differences in average yearly 
changes in property values between dismissed and non-dismissed counties. Models include 
controls for percent White, percent Black, and proportion of nearby school districts that 
have had orders dismissed, as well as year fixed effects. Here, unlike in the figures above, 
the outcome is yearly change in property taxes. Column (1) presents estimates for all 
counties, regardless of neighborhood racial composition. Column (2) presents estimates 
only among high percentage White and Black PUMAs. A supplemental propensity score 





Table 3-2: Regression Estimates of Difference in Average Yearly Change in 
Property Taxes Collected Between Dismissed and Non-Dismissed Districts by 
Relative Year of Dismissal 
    (1) (2) 
Time to Termination   All Counties 
High % White or 
Black PUMAs 
White         
-7 to -1 years D 9.2   -2.1   
  ND 16.1   0.6   
  Diff -6.8 (0.069) -2.8*** (.001) 
  Obs 93   69   
          
0 to 6 years D -1.7   -2.9   
  ND -0.9   -3.0   
  Diff -0.8 (0.005) 0.04 (.011) 
  Obs 270   270   
          
7 to 13 years D -0.5   1.5   
  ND -6.5   -6.4   
  Diff 5.9*** (.009) 8.0*** (.015) 
  Obs 297   297   
            
Black         
-7 to -1 years D 9.8   -6.4   
  ND 11.4   -1.6   
  Diff -1.6 -0.058 -4.8 (.059) 
  Obs 93   73   
          
0 to 6 years D 1.2   -0.7   
  ND -1.5   -1.9   
  Diff 2.8*** (.004) 1.1*** (.005) 
  Obs 270   270   
          
7 to 13 years D -1.1   -0.6   
  ND -5.1   -3.6   
  Diff 3.9*** (.008) 2.9** (.012) 
  Obs 297  297   
            
Notes: D = Dismissed, ND = Not dismissed, Diff = Difference. Clustered standard 
errors of differences are in parentheses.  
Estimates are for models with controls for % White and Black in counties, 
proportion of nearby districts that are dismissed, and include year fixed effects. 
*, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance using a two-tailed test 
with p < 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
  
Beginning with Column (1), White differences in yearly average property taxes 
between dismissed and non-dismissed counties do not exhibit statistical significance until 
7 to 13 years post-dismissal. This is consistent with Figure 3-1, in which property taxes 
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only started diverging about 7 years post-treatment. During this late period, dismissed 
counties had an average White yearly change of -0.5 percentage points, while White 
property taxes in non-dismissed counties had an average change of -6.5 percentage points. 
It appears that White home values in non-dismissed counties saw a much larger annual 
loss in property values than did White home values in counties that were still under 
desegregation orders. To put things into perspective, White home values in dismissed 
counties began by exhibiting strong annual gains, then showed mild annual losses, and 
ended with even milder annual losses. White home values in non-dismissed counties also 
began with strong annual gains, then showed slight annual losses, and ended with 
moderate annual losses.  
Dismissed versus non-dismissed Black home value trends appear to have diverged a 
bit earlier than did those for White homes, with statistical significance appearing as early 
as the 0 to 6 year period. In the years immediately following dismissal, Black property 
values in dismissed counties were actually trending up, while values in non-dismissed 
counties trended downward. By the 7 to 13 year post-dismissal period, both Black 
dismissed and non-dismissed home values were trending down, though Black values in 
non-dismissed districts were decreasing at a much steeper rate.  Comparing across time, 
Black values in dismissed counties began with strong annual gains, followed by small 
annual gains, and ended with small annual losses. Black values in non-dismissed counties 
began with strong annual gains, followed by small annual losses, and ended with moderate 
annual losses.  
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 Turning to Column (2), White average annual property taxes in PUMAS with high 
percentages of White residents exhibited diverging trends before orders were dismissed, 
with values in dismissed counties trending down on average, while values in non-dismissed 
counties trended slightly upward. After this, dismissed and non-dismissed values exhibited 
yearly changes closely resembling each other until about 7 to 13 years post-dismissal. At 
this point, White home values in dismissed counties showed average gains of about 1.5 
percentage points, while White home values in non-dismissed counties had average losses 
of about 6.4 percentage points. Here, dismissed White values in high percentage White 
neighborhoods began with mild losses, followed by slightly larger losses, and ended with 
slight annual gains. Non-dismissed began with very small annual gains, followed by small 
annual losses, and ended with moderate annual losses.  
Black home values in PUMAs with high percentages of Black residents trended down 
among both comparison groups in all three time periods captured here. Statistically 
significant differences between dismissed and non-dismissed county trends first appear in 
the 0 to 6 year period, when non-dismissed values began trending down at a steeper rate 
than did dismissed values. By 7 to 13 years post-dismissal, Black home values in high 
percentage Black neighborhoods that were in dismissed counties exhibited a slight 
downward trend. Corresponding values in non-dismissed PUMAs exhibited a steeper 
decline, about 3.6 percentage points of home value lost per year. Over time, dismissed 
Black values in high percentage Black neighborhoods showed moderate annual losses, 
followed by slight annual losses, and ended with continued slight annual losses. Non-
dismissed values began with slight annual losses, followed by continued slight annual 




 The effects of the 2008 recession are likely captured in Figures 3-1 through 3-4 as 
the bubble occurring right before and right after many orders were dismissed. This 
accounts for the sizable annual gains in property values shown in the all counties sample 
before termination across comparison groups. In light of this, a picture of post-recession 
property value recovery differences by race and dismissal status emerges.  
Before adjusting for covariates, White property values in dismissed counties appear 
to have experienced a slight recovery after the Great Recession, with unadjusted trends in 
home values trending up about 7 years after dismissal. White property values in non-
dismissed counties, however, appear to have experienced no such recovery, and continued 
to decline (albeit at a less steep rate) in the years after the Recession occurred. White home 
values in PUMAs with high percentages of White residents showed a similar patterning, 
with dismissed values improving after the Recession and non-dismissed values staying 
fairly flat. Black property values, on the other hand, declined or flattened after the Great 
Recession regardless of dismissal status. 
After adjusting for covariates, including the percentages Black and White in areas, 
the only type of home values that experienced a recovery in the late (7-13 year post-
dismissal) period, which in most cases overlaps with the aftermath of the Great Recession, 
were those of White residents in dismissed districts, both in the all county sample and in 
the high percentage White PUMA sample, though homes in the latter group did best (this 
was the only group that showed adjusted annual increases in home values in the late 
period). White home values in non-dismissed counties were all doing worse at the end of 
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observation than at the beginning. Black home values in non-dismissed counties, regardless 
of neighborhood racial composition, also were worse off at the end of observation than at 
the beginning. Of note, Black home values in high concentration Black neighborhoods were 
doing better than they did at the beginning of observation, though they did still see an 
average loss in home values.  
All of this implies that having desegregation orders dismissed may have conferred 
some benefit to White home values in the years after dismissal and after the Great 
Recession. This all likely operates via changes in demand for housing in Black and White 
neighborhoods. In the absence of desegregation orders that acted to shuffle where students 
attended school, there was likely decreased or flattened demand for housing in Black 
neighborhoods and increased demand in White neighborhoods. Since many neighborhoods 
are residentially segregated, the absence of desegregation plans would remove incentives 
to live in Black neighborhoods that were formerly tracked into integrated schools by 
removing access to those traditionally better resourced and more diverse schools. It would 
also increase incentives to live in White neighborhoods, where the pipeline to better 
schools would remain.  
Also of note, divergences in property values between dismissed and non-dismissed 
districts tend to appear at around 7 years post termination. This is consistent with Reardon 
et al.’s (2012) findings of lagged effects of resegregation (though they picked up effects 
about a year sooner – this could be a result of the staggered timing of surveys, though). 
In conclusion, since most Americans hold the majority of their wealth in housing, 
and as the ability to build wealth depends on how much wealth households have to begin 
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with, these differences in property values may have compounding effects down the line. 
Further, as school quality is largely a function of how much funding is brought in via 
property taxes, racial gaps in wealth and educational attainment may increase over time. 
Due to data limitations, it is currently unknown exactly how having orders dismissed leads 
to benefits in housing value security and growth for White homes. This is an important area 







 Throughout the course of this dissertation, I attempted to provide answers to the 
following main questions: 
1. What were the predictors of release from school desegregation orders over the last 
few decades? 
2. How did Black and White test scores respond to release from desegregation orders? 
3. How did home values respond to release from desegregation orders? 
 This was undertaken so that we might have an adequate understanding of how 
fading enforcement of desegregation orders, one of the most successful policies ever 
implemented with the express purpose of improving the educational outcomes of minority 
children, affects the way that targeted children and families experience their worlds. This 
dissertation aimed to remedy gaps in our knowledge of modern day desegregation policy 
by analyzing the effects of lifting desegregation orders on educational outcomes and 
property values. In the course of analysis, I found: 
 There were few systematic predictors of whether school districts would seek 
release from desegregation orders; that is, that school districts who had their orders 
dismissed were fairly similar in observed characteristics to school districts that 
remained under order. There appears to be little evidence that the racial 
composition or integration of schools were meaningful predictors of order release. 
 Comparing scores from elementary and middle school students in school districts 
that were released from desegregation orders to scores from students in nearby 
districts still under orders, test scores among White students in dismissed districts 
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began to increase about 10 years after release. Test scores among Black students 
also increased, but at a lower rate than those of White students. As a result of these 
two patterns, the White/Black gap in test scores widened over time in school 
districts released from desegregation oversight. In districts still under 
desegregation orders, the gap actually narrowed in every subject and school type. 
 In the aftermath of the Great Recession, having desegregation orders dismissed may 
have conferred some benefit to White home values. White home values in dismissed 
districts exhibited a much stronger post-Recession recovery than did White home 
values in non-dismissed districts or Black home values in either dismissed or non-
dismissed areas. 
 These findings have multiple implications. First, they confirm that resegregation 
likely had tangible effects in areas released from desegregation orders. They also confirm 
that the effects of order dismissals usually do not appear immediately, instead taking more 
than a decade to manifest in many cases. Most importantly, they describe a landscape of 
unequal opportunity for Black children and families in the United States, characterized by 
diminished performance on school tests and poorer chances of recovering from major 
economic shocks.  
 Desegregation worked well once. Faced with inarguable violations of the civil rights 
of millions of students, the federal government was once forced to commit its resources to 
providing equal educational opportunity to all children in the United States, regardless of 
race or ethnicity. Over time, that commitment faded, taking with it many of the gains 
researchers, advocates, and policymakers fought for half a century ago. Evidence of the 
 77 
 
effectiveness of desegregation plans is plentiful, and the corpus of evidence pointing to the 
negative effects of desegregation release is growing. The goal of this dissertation was to 
add to that corpus, and aid policymakers with an empirical portrait of what happened to 
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Appendix 1: School Districts Released from Desegregation Orders 
District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
Geneva City Geneva AL 1974 
Baldwin County Bay Minette AL 1977 
Brewton City Brewton AL 1977 
Clarke County Grove Hill AL 1977 
Dallas County Selma AL 1977 
Escambia County Brewton AL 1977 
Jasper City Jasper AL 1977 
Linden City Linden AL 1977 
Selma City Selma AL 1977 
Thomasville City Thomasville AL 1977 
Walker County Jasper AL 1977 
Washington County Chatom AL 1977 
Conecuh County Evergreen AL 1979 
Demopolis City Demopolis AL 1979 
Wilcox County Alberta AL 1979 
Hale County Greensboro AL 1982 
Monroe County Monroeville AL 1982 
Perry County Marion AL 1982 
Birmingham City Birmingham AL 1983 
Marengo County Linden AL 1983 
Talladega County Talladega AL 1985 
Lowndes County Hayneville AL 1991 
Montgomery County Montgomery AL 1993 
Talladega City Talladega AL 1993 
Sylacauga City Sylacauga AL 1995 
Mobile County Mobile AL 1997 
Bullock County Union Springs AL 1999 
Tuscaloosa City Tuscaloosa AL 2000 
Alexander City Alexander City AL 2002 
Andalusia City Andalusia AL 2002 
Auburn City Auburn AL 2002 
Butler County Greenville AL 2002 
Chilton County Clanton AL 2002 
Daleville City Daleville AL 2002 
Geneva County Geneva AL 2002 
Opelika City Opelika AL 2002 
Opp City Opp AL 2002 
Ozark City Ozark AL 2002 
Russell County Seale AL 2002 
Enterprise City Enterprise AL 2003 
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District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
Eufaula City Eufaula AL 2003 
Greene County Eutaw AL 2003 
Tallassee City Tallassee AL 2003 
Coffee County Elba AL 2004 
Cullman City Cullman AL 2004 
Elba City Elba AL 2004 
Elmore County Wetumpka AL 2004 
Tallapoosa County Dadeville AL 2004 
Winston County Double Springs AL 2004 
Autauga County Prattville AL 2005 
Blount County Oneonta AL 2005 
Cherokee County Centre AL 2005 
Dale County Ozark AL 2005 
Gadsden City Gadsden AL 2005 
Lee County Opelika AL 2005 
Mountain Brook City Mountain Brook AL 2005 
Oneonta City Oneonta AL 2005 
Phenix City Phenix City AL 2005 
Troy City Troy AL 2005 
Athens City Athens AL 2006 
Attalla City Attalla AL 2006 
Bessemer City Bessemer AL 2006 
Coosa County Rockford AL 2006 
Covington County Andalusia AL 2006 
Crenshaw County Luverne AL 2006 
Dekalb County Fort Payne AL 2006 
Dothan City Dothan AL 2006 
Henry County Abbeville AL 2006 
Macon County Tuskegee AL 2006 
Midfield City Midfield AL 2006 
Bibb County Centreville AL 2007 
Etowah County Gadsden AL 2007 
Muscle Shoals City Muscle Shoals AL 2007 
Pike County Troy AL 2007 
Roanoke City Roanoke AL 2007 
Vestavia Hills City Vestavia Hills AL 2007 
Houston County Dothan AL 2008 
Guntersville City Guntersville AL 2011 
Barbour County Clayton AL 2013 
Mineral Springs School Dist. Mineral Springs AR 1971 
Helena/ W.Helena School Dist. Helena AR 2002 
Altheimer Unified School Dist.*  AR 2003 
Bright Star*  AR 2003 
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District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
Cotton Plant*  AR 2003 
Earle School District Earle AR 2003 
Hazen School District Hazen AR 2003 
Fort Smith School District Fort Smith AR 2004 
Bradley School District Bradley AR 2005 
Little Rock School District Little Rock AR 2007 
Phoenix Elementary District Phoenix AZ 2005 
Pasadena Unified Pasadena CA 1979 
Oxnard Oxnard CA 1987 
San Diego Unified San Diego CA 1998 
San Jose Unified San Jose CA 1998 
San Francisco Unified San Francisco CA 2005 
Bakersfield City Bakersfield CA 2011 
School District No. 1 In The County 
Of Denver And State Of C Denver CO 1995 
Brandywine School District Claymont DE 1996 
Christina School District Wilmington DE 1996 
Colonial School District New Castle DE 1996 
Red Clay Consolidated School District Wilmington DE 1996 
Volusia Deland FL 1970 
Alachua Gainesville FL 1971 
Sarasota Sarasota FL 1971 
Leon Tallahassee FL 1974 
Brevard Viera FL 1978 
Palm Beach West Palm Beach FL 1979 
Columbia Lake City FL 1987 
Broward Fort Lauderdale FL 1996 
St. Lucie Fort Pierce FL 1997 
Lee Fort Myers FL 1999 
Pinellas Largo FL 2000 
Polk Bartow FL 2000 
Dade Miami FL 2001 
Duval Jacksonville FL 2001 
Hillsborough Tampa FL 2001 
Escambia Pensacola FL 2004 
Seminole Sanford FL 2006 
Marion Ocala FL 2007 
Baker Macclenny FL 2009 
Gulf Port St Joe FL 2009 
Lafayette Mayo FL 2009 
Wakulla Crawfordville FL 2009 
Orange Orlando FL 2010 
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District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
Clayton County Jonesboro GA 1977 
Atlanta Public Schools Atlanta GA 1979 
Jackson County Jefferson GA 1985 
Jefferson City Jefferson GA 1985 
Chatham County Savannah GA 1994 
Coffee County Douglas GA 1995 
Dekalb County Stone Mountain GA 1996 
Muscogee County Columbus GA 1997 
Bulloch County Statesboro GA 2001 
Fulton County Atlanta GA 2003 
Long County Ludowici GA 2003 
Troup County Lagrange GA 2003 
Brooks County Quitman GA 2005 
Butts County Jackson GA 2005 
Echols County Statenville GA 2005 
Wilkes County Washington GA 2005 
Bleckley County Cochran GA 2006 
Chattahoochee County Cusseta GA 2006 
Clay County Fort Gaines GA 2006 
Jasper County Monticello GA 2006 
Lowndes County Valdosta GA 2006 
Mcintosh County Darien GA 2006 
Morgan County Madison GA 2006 
Pelham City Pelham GA 2006 
Quitman County Georgetown GA 2006 
Schley County Ellaville GA 2006 
Seminole County Donalsonville GA 2006 
Thomas County Thomasville GA 2006 
Webster County Preston GA 2006 
Baker County Newton GA 2007 
Bibb County Macon GA 2007 
Candler County Metter GA 2007 
Cook County Adel GA 2007 
Crawford County Roberta GA 2007 
Decatur City Decatur GA 2007 
Decatur County Bainbridge GA 2007 
Grady County Cairo GA 2007 
Hancock County Sparta GA 2007 
Jones County Gray GA 2007 
Lamar County Barnesville GA 2007 
Putnam County Eatonton GA 2007 
Treutlen County Soperton GA 2007 
Turner County Ashburn GA 2007 
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District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
Walton County Monroe GA 2007 
Wilkinson County Irwinton GA 2007 
Atkinson County Pearson GA 2008 
Baldwin County Milledgeville GA 2008 
Hart County Hartwell GA 2008 
Jefferson County Louisville GA 2008 
Jenkins County Millen GA 2008 
Johnson County Wrightsville GA 2008 
Laurens County Dublin GA 2008 
Marion County Buena Vista GA 2008 
Meriwether County Greenville GA 2008 
Rome City Rome GA 2008 
Terrell County Dawson GA 2008 
Toombs County Lyons GA 2008 
Walker County Lafayette GA 2008 
Ben Hill County Fitzgerald GA 2009 
Charlton County Folkston GA 2009 
Elbert County Elberton GA 2009 
Harris County Hamilton GA 2009 
Lee County Leesburg GA 2009 
Macon County Oglethorpe GA 2009 
Miller County Colquitt GA 2009 
Twiggs County Jeffersonville GA 2012 
Dublin City Dublin GA 2013 
Richmond County Augusta GA 2013 
Rockford Sd 205 Rockford IL 2001 
Champaign Cusd 4 Champaign IL 2009 
City Of Chicago Sd 299 Chicago IL 2009 
Avon Community School Corp Avon IN 1998 
Beech Grove City Schools Beech Grove IN 1998 
Brownsburg Community Sch Corp Brownsburg IN 1998 
Carmel Clay Schools Carmel IN 1998 
Decatur County Com Schools Greensburg IN 1998 
Franklin Township Com Sch Corp Indianapolis IN 1998 
Greenfield-Central Com Schools Greenfield IN 1998 
Greenwood Community Sch Corp Greenwood IN 1998 
M S D Decatur Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
M S D Lawrence Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
M S D Perry Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
M S D Pike Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
M S D Warren County Williamsport IN 1998 
M S D Warren Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
M S D Washington Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
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District Name City State 
Year 
Lifted 
    
M S D Wayne Township Indianapolis IN 1998 
Mooresville Con School Corp Mooresville IN 1998 
Mt Vernon Community Sch Corp Fortville IN 1998 
Perry Central Com Schools Corp Leopold IN 1998 
Pike County School Corp Petersburg IN 1998 
Plainfield Community Sch Corp Plainfield IN 1998 
School Town Of Speedway Speedway IN 1998 
Washington Com Schools Washington IN 1998 
Western Wayne Schools Pershing IN 1998 
Evansville Vanderburgh Sch Corp Evansville IN 2005 
Kansas City Kansas City KS 1997 
Topeka Public Schools Topeka KS 1999 
Jefferson County Louisville KY 2000 
Iberia Parish New Iberia LA 1970 
Vermilion Parish Abbeville LA 1974 
Acadia Parish Crowley LA 1981 
Livingston Parish Livingston LA 2001 
Iberville Parish Plaquemine LA 2002 
East Baton Rouge Parish Baton Rouge LA 2003 
Ascension Parish Donaldsonville LA 2004 
Red River Parish Coushatta LA 2005 
Tensas Parish St. Joseph LA 2005 
Jefferson Parish Harvey LA 2006 
Lafayette Parish Lafayette LA 2006 
Rapides Parish Alexandria LA 2006 
St. Bernard Parish Chalmette LA 2006 
Grant Parish Colfax LA 2007 
West Feliciana Parish St. Francisville LA 2007 
East Carroll Parish Lake Providence LA 2008 
City Of Bogalusa School District Bogalusa LA 2009 
Madison Parish Tallulah LA 2010 
Caldwell Parish Columbia LA 2011 
Jefferson Davis Parish Jennings LA 2011 
Evangeline Parish Ville Platte LA 2012 
Franklin Parish Winnsboro LA 2013 
Morehouse Parish Bastrop LA 2013 
Ouachita Parish Monroe LA 2013 
Boston Boston MA 1987 
Holyoke Holyoke MA 2004 
Prince George's County Public 
Schools Upper Marlboro MD 2002 
Detroit City School District Detroit MI 1977 
Ferndale Public Schools Ferndale MI 1995 
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Pontiac City School District Pontiac MI 2000 
Benton Harbor Area Schools Benton Harbor MI 2002 
Flint School District Of The City Of Flint MI 2002 
Ferguson-Florissant R-Ii Florissant MO 1975 
Fort Osage R-I Independence MO 1984 
Lafayette Co. C-1 Higginsville MO 1989 
Affton 101 St Louis MO 1999 
Bayless St Louis MO 1999 
Brentwood Brentwood MO 1999 
Clayton Clayton MO 1999 
Hancock Place St Louis MO 1999 
Kirkwood R-Vii Kirkwood MO 1999 
Ladue St Louis MO 1999 
Lindbergh Schools St Louis MO 1999 
Maplewood-Richmond Heights Maplewood MO 1999 
Mehlville R-Ix St Louis MO 1999 
Parkway C-2 Chesterfield MO 1999 
Ritenour St Louis MO 1999 
Rockwood R-Vi Eureka MO 1999 
Specl. Sch. Dst. St. Louis Co. Town & Country MO 1999 
St. Louis City St Louis MO 1999 
Valley Park Valley Park MO 1999 
Webster Groves Webster Groves MO 1999 
Hickman Mills C-1 Kansas City MO 2003 
Independence 30 Independence MO 2003 
Kansas City 33 Kansas City MO 2003 
Liberty 53 Liberty MO 2003 
Raytown C-2 Raytown MO 2003 
Grandview C-4 Grandview MO 2005 
Pattonville R-Iii St Ann MO 2005 
Corinth School Dist Corinth MS 1976 
Jackson Public School Dist Jackson MS 1980 
Jackson Co School Dist Vancleave MS 1981 
Hinds Co School Dist Raymond MS 1984 
Grenada School Dist Grenada MS 1985 
Oxford School District Oxford MS 1988 
Lafayette Co School Dist Oxford MS 1989 
Smith Co School Dist Raleigh MS 1992 
Greenville Public Schools Greenville MS 1994 
Hattiesburg Public School Dist Hattiesburg MS 1997 
Biloxi Public School Dist Biloxi MS 2002 
East Tallahatchie Consol Sch Dist Charleston MS 2003 
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Harrison Co School Dist Gulfport MS 2003 
Humphreys Co School Dist Belzoni MS 2003 
Natchez-Adams School Dist Natchez MS 2003 
Newton County School District Decatur MS 2003 
Sunflower Co School Dist Indianola MS 2003 
Noxubee County School District Macon MS 2004 
South Delta School District Rolling Fork MS 2004 
Wilkinson Co School Dist Woodville MS 2004 
Hazlehurst City School District Hazlehurst MS 2005 
Leflore Co School Dist Greenwood MS 2005 
Marshall Co School Dist Holly Springs MS 2005 
Tishomingo Co Sp Mun Sch Dist Iuka MS 2005 
Madison Co School Dist Flora MS 2006 
West Tallahatchie School District Webb MS 2006 
Calhoun Co School Dist Pittsboro MS 2007 
Coffeeville School Dist Coffeeville MS 2007 
Columbus Municipal School Dist Columbus MS 2007 
Pontotoc Co School Dist Pontotoc MS 2007 
Union Public School Dist Union MS 2007 
Indianola School Dist Indianola MS 2008 
Vicksburg Warren School Dist Vicksburg MS 2008 
Philadelphia Public School Dist Philadelphia MS 2010 
Enterprise School Dist Enterprise MS 2012 
Lowndes Co School Dist Columbus MS 2012 
Mccomb School District Mccomb MS 2012 
Beaufort County Schools Washington NC 1972 
Guilford County Schools Greensboro NC 1972 
Iredell-Statesville Schools Statesville NC 1972 
Union County Public Schools Monroe NC 1972 
Anson County Schools Wadesboro NC 1973 
Northampton County Schools Jackson NC 1976 
Cumberland County Schools Fayetteville NC 1978 
Edgecombe County Schools Tarboro NC 1979 
Goldsboro City*  NC 1979 
New Hanover County Schools Wilmington NC 1983 
Forsyth County Schools Winston Salem NC 1984 
Johnston County Schools Smithfield NC 1995 
Bladen County Schools Elizabethtown NC 1997 
Jones County Schools Trenton NC 1997 
Wilson County Schools Wilson NC 1997 
Nash-Rocky Mount Schools Nashville NC 1998 
Durham Public Schools Durham NC 1999 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Charlotte NC 2002 
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Alamance-Burlington Schools Burlington NC 2009 
Bertie County Schools Windsor NC 2009 
Pitt County Schools Greenville NC 2013 
Omaha Public Schools Omaha NE 1984 
Bridgeport Public Schools Bridgeport NE 2005 
Holly Grove*  NO 2003 
Buffalo City School District Buffalo NY 1995 
Yonkers City School District Yonkers NY 2002 
New York City Geographic District 
#18 Brooklyn NY 2008 
Columbus City School District Columbus OH 1988 
Cincinnati City Cincinnati OH 1991 
Lorain City Lorain OH 1994 
Cleveland Municipal Cleveland OH 1998 
Lima City Lima OH 1999 
Dayton City Dayton OH 2002 
Tulsa Tulsa OK 1983 
Oklahoma City Oklahoma City OK 1991 
Pittsburgh Sd Pittsburgh PA 1983 
Woodland Hills Sd Pittsburgh PA 2000 
Philadelphia City Sd Philadelphia PA 2009 
Abbeville 60 Abbeville SC 1984 
Greenville 01 Greenville SC 1985 
Orangeburg 05 Orangeburg SC 1990 
Charleston 01 Charleston SC 1994 
Darlington 01 Darlington SC 1999 
Lee 01 Bishopville SC 2001 
Saluda 01 Saluda SC 2002 
Mccormick 01 Mccormick SC 2003 
Bamberg 02 Denmark SC 2004 
Berkeley 01 Moncks Corner SC 2004 
Clarendon 02 Manning SC 2004 
Colleton 01 Walterboro SC 2004 
Hampton 01 Hampton SC 2004 
Anderson 03 Iva SC 2005 
Florence 04 Timmonsville SC 2005 
Hampton 02 Estill SC 2005 
Lexington 01 Lexington SC 2005 
Fairfield 01 Winnsboro SC 2006 
Orangeburg 03 Holly Hill SC 2006 
Sumter 02 Sumter SC 2012 
Knox County Knoxville TN 1967 
Maury County Columbia TN 1969 
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Hamilton County Chattanooga TN 1986 




Memphis Memphis TN 1992 
Davidson County Nashville TN 1998 
Bells Bells TN 2006 
Crockett County Alamo TN 2007 
Tipton County Covington TN 2007 
Bradford Bradford TN 2008 
Gibson Co Sp Dist Dyer TN 2008 
Humboldt Humboldt TN 2008 
Trenton Trenton TN 2008 
Shelby County Memphis TN 2009 
Madison County Jackson TN 2010 
New Braunfels Isd New Braunfels TX 1979 
Sweeny Isd Sweeny TX 1980 
Gregory-Portland Isd Portland TX 1981 
Austin Isd Austin TX 1983 
Houston Isd Houston TX 1983 
Beaumont Isd Beaumont TX 1984 
Bryan Isd Bryan TX 1987 
San Felipe-Del Rio Cisd Del Rio TX 1988 
Waco Isd Waco TX 1989 
Fort Worth Isd Fort Worth TX 1990 
Lubbock Isd Lubbock TX 1991 
Corpus Christi Isd Corpus Christi TX 1992 
Dallas Isd Dallas TX 1994 
Carthage Isd Carthage TX 1995 
Wichita Falls Isd Wichita Falls TX 1999 
Kilgore Isd Kilgore TX 2000 
Lufkin Isd Lufkin TX 2000 
Sulphur Springs Isd Sulphur Springs TX 2000 
Temple Isd Temple TX 2000 
Jefferson Isd Jefferson TX 2001 
Aldine Isd Houston TX 2002 
Midland Isd Midland TX 2002 
San Augustine Isd San Augustine TX 2006 
Galena Park Isd Houston TX 2007 
Hearne Isd Hearne TX 2007 
Katy Isd Katy TX 2007 
La Vega Isd Waco TX 2007 
Port Arthur Isd Port Arthur TX 2007 
Klein Isd Klein TX 2008 
Tatum Isd Tatum TX 2008 
Galveston Isd Galveston TX 2009 
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Crosby Isd Crosby TX 2010 




Ector County Isd Odessa TX 2010 
Henderson Isd Henderson TX 2010 
Denison Isd Denison TX 2011 
Halifax Co Pblc Schs Halifax VA 1970 
Portsmouth City Pblc Schs Portsmouth VA 1971 
Chesterfield Co Pblc Schs Chesterfield VA 1972 
Henrico Co Pblc Schs Henrico VA 1972 
Richmond City Pblc Schs Richmond VA 1972 
Norfolk City Pblc Schs Norfolk VA 1985 
Greensville Co Pblc Schs Emporia VA 2002 
Loudoun Co Pblc Schs Ashburn VA 2006 
Franklin City Pblc Schs Franklin VA 2008 
Southampton Co Pblc Schs Courtland VA 2008 






Note: As a supplemental analysis, the group of non-dismissed counties was also weighted by their propensity 
to have their orders terminated, using Stata 15’s psmatch2 command, in order to create an alternate 
comparison group. Counties were weighted on pre-treatment characteristics, all observed in 2000, before the 
window of observation of counties in the ACS (2005 – 2015), including: district teacher student ratios, 
percent Black and White students in districts, decade of order initiation, urban status, child poverty rate, the 
number of schools in districts, the number of students per school in districts, the total size in students of 
school districts, and state. Results should be interpreted with caution, however, as the matching algorithm 
used was unable to find matches at high propensities of treatment in many cases, resulting in small sample 
sizes. Results follow: 
Table A: Weighted Regression Estimates of Difference in Average Yearly Change in Property 
Taxes Collected Between Dismissed and Non-Dismissed Districts by Relative Year of Dismissal 
    (1) (2) 
Time to Termination   All Counties 
High % White or Black 
PUMAs 
White         
-7 to -1 years D 11.4   -2.2   
  ND -1.6   1.0   
  Diff 13.1* (0.063) -3.2*** (.008) 
  Obs 37   26   
          
0 to 6 years D -1.9   -3.5   
  ND -0.7   -1.9   
  Diff -1.2 (.008) -1.5 (.017) 
  Obs 123   123   
          
7 to 13 years D -0.7   -0.05   
  ND -8.3   -9.5   
  Diff 7.5** (.034) 9.5* (.055) 
  Obs 98   98   
            
Black         
-7 to -1 years D 11.3   -5.7   
  ND -4.8   -15.3   
  Diff 16.1*** (.039) 9.6** (.036) 
  Obs 37   26   
          
0 to 6 years D 0.9   -1.0   
  ND -2.1   -2.2   
  Diff 3.1*** (.007) 1.2 (.011) 
  Obs 123   123   
          
7 to 13 years D -0.8   0.6   
  ND -6.5   -5.1   
  Diff 5.6* (.029) 5.8 (.039) 
  Obs 98  98   
            
Notes: D = Dismissed, ND = Not dismissed, Diff = Difference. Clustered standard errors of 
differences are in parentheses.  
Estimates are for models with controls for % White and Black in counties, proportion of nearby 
districts that are dismissed, and include year fixed effects. 
*, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance using a two-tailed test with p < 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01 
 
